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I. 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to the proceedings are named in the caption. 
Cited statutes and procedural rules are set forth in the 
Appendix. 
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IV. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does due process of law require a court, pursuant to Rule 
60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to vacate an order entered in 
violation of adopted procedural rules? 
2. Is it an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse 
to grant relief under Rule 60, U.R.C.P., from an order obtained 
through violation of procedural rules? 
3. Are the Rules of Civil Practice set forth as Article 5 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration "rules of practice" which 
are binding on litigants? 
V. 
OFFICIAL REPORTS 
This case was decided by the Court of Appeals in an unpub-
lished opinion dated July 29, 1992 (attached as Exhibit A). 
VI. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The revised opinion of the Court of Appeals on rehearing was 
filed July 29, 1992. This court signed an order dated August 25, 
1992 extending the date for filing a petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to September 8, 1992. (Exhibit B). 
This court has jurisdiction to grant Certiorari pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Seven and a half months following entry of judgment in the 
trial court and seven months after notice of appeal was filed in 
this case, defendant, Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (here-
inafter "Fidelity"), filed an order with the trial court which 
purported to deny a Rule 52(b) motion. Due to a filing error, 
plaintiff's counsel was unaware the order had been submitted or 
signed until Fidelity, in its reply brief, suggested the Court of 
Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because a new notice 
of appeal had not been filed. The Court of Appeals agreed and 
dismissed the case. See, DeBry v. Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Co., 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992) (hereinafter 
referred to as "Fidelity I") (copy attached as Exhibit D). 
Upon receipt of appellees' brief raising the jurisdictional 
issue, the DeBrys filed a Rule 60 motion in the trial court to 
amend or vacate the order. (Exhibit E). Plaintiff claimed: 
a) No Rule 52(b) motion was ever filed by plaintiff; 
b) The order denying the purported Rule 52(b) motion was 
obtained by a systematic violation of procedural rules; 
c) Fidelity should not be rewarded for violating procedural 
rules by having the DeBrys' appeal dismissed on juris-
dictional grounds. 
Judge Brian denied the Rule 60 motion. (Exhibit F). Plain-
tiffs appealed. (Exhibit G.) 
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In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals summarily 
dismissed the appeal. (Exhibit H). Plaintiffs sought a rehearing 
which was granted. (Exhibit I) . A new unpublished opinion was 
filed July 29, 1992. (Exhibit A). 
The gist of the Appeals Court's ruling is that: 
a) The issue of whether the plaintiff filed a Rule 52(b) 
motion was ruled on in Fidelity I; and 
b) The Rules of Practice set forth in Article 5 of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration do not rise to the level 
of procedural rules which are binding on the court or 
counsel, and, therefore, the DeBrys were not prejudiced 
by Fidelity's violations of these rules or by the Trial 
Court's neglect to follow them. 
The issues in this appeal are whether the rules set forth in 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration are binding on litigants 
and rise to the level of procedural rules which can be relied on by 
counsel and the courts in conducting litigation; and whether due 
process is offended if a court refuses to amend or vacate an order 
obtained by violation of procedural rules. 
VIII. 
FACTS 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. and certified the 
case for appeal under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. 
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Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand 
delivered proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and judg-
ment to the DeBrys' counsel. (See Exhibit C, Appendix). 
On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment on all other 
counsel in the case. (Exhibit J, Appendix). 
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings and 
judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit K, Appendix). 
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys' counsel filed objections to the 
form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. (Exhibit L). 
Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed 
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed 
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit M, Appendix). For the next seven 
months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot 
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b) 
Motion. 
Approximately seven months after Notice of Appeal was filed, 
Fidelity, ex parte. obtained the signature of the trial court on an 
order which purported to deny a Rule 52(b) motion to alter or amend 
the May 2, 1990 Judgment. (Exhibit F, Appendix). 
Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990 order, 
(Exhibit F) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal. 
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Eight months later when Fidelity filed its brief in the Court 
of Appeals, it (for the first time) claimed that the Court of 
Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys' appeal on its 
merits because there was no notice of appeal filed following entry 
of the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit F). See Appellees* Brief 
in Fidelity I at Point I. (Exhibit N, Appendix). 
The Court of Appeals accepted Fidelity's argument and dis-
missed the appeal without reaching the merits. DeBry v. Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Company, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. 
1992) . (Exhibit C) . That decision is before this court in a 
petition for writ of certiorari filed in Fidelity I. 
Meanwhile, upon discovery of the December 11 order by receipt 
of appellees' brief, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate or amend 
the December 11, 1990 order. (Exhibit E) . This motion was denied. 
(Exhibit O) . Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the motion. 
(Exhibit G) . (This appeal is referred to hereafter as "Fidelity 
II") . 
Prior to briefing the appeal in Fidelity II, the Court of 
Appeals on its own motion asked for memoranda from the parties on 
the issue of summary disposition. (Exhibit P). 
The DeBrys filed a memorandum explaining why summary dispo-
sition was improper. (Exhibit Q). The Court of Appeals issued an 
opinion on June 17, 1992, summarily dismissing the appeal in 
Fidelity II. (Exhibit H). Because the DeBrys felt the Court of 
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Appeals had glossed over important issues, a petition for rehearing 
was filed. (Exhibit R). Rehearing was granted. (Exhibit I). A 
new unpublished opinion was filed. (Exhibit A). 
The DeBrys seek review of the revised opinion of the Court of 
Appeals in Fidelity II by filing this petition. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CIVIL PRACTICE RULES OF THE UTAH 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION ARE 
BINDING PROCEDURAL RULES 
In its unpublished opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals 
has ruled that the civil practice rules set forth in Article 5 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration do not have the effect of 
procedural rules which are binding on litigants and the court. 
July 29 Opinion at 3 (Exhibit A). The effect of this ruling is to 
hold that the published civil practice rules are not binding on 
litigants and can be violated without consequence. Thus, a 
litigant cannot rely on the other parties following the rules 
because the Court of Appeals says they exist merely to provide 
"guidance." .Id. This ruling flies in the face of the Rules 
themselves which state their intent to be: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing 
motions, supporting memoranda and documents 
with the court. 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
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The introduction to the Code of Judicial Administration 
(Exhibit S) states that the Rules have been adopted by the Supreme 
Court and Judicial Counsel for the purpose of creating a uniform 
procedure in the courts. The provisions of the Rules allow counsel 
to rely on receiving notices of actions taken by opposing counsel 
which may affect their clients' rights. 
The ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case, that these 
rules are not "rules of procedure" which can be relied upon by the 
parties, is in direct conflict with the introductory language of 
the code (Exhibit S). Counsel should be able to rely on litigants 
following these rules. 
In Lloyd v. Third Judicial District Court, 27 Utah 2d 322, 495 
P.2d 1262 (1972) this court defined due process of law as: 
[A] course of legal proceedings according to 
those rules and principles which have been 
established in our systems of jurisprudence 
for the enforcement and protection of private 
rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324. 
This court adopted the Civil Practice Rules contained in the 
Code of Judicial Administration. Due process constraints preclude 
a ruling which arbitrarily states the rules do not apply. Parties 
have a right to rely on practice and procedure rules being enforced 
as written. E.g.. Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d 
662 (1966); Schleinina v. Estate of Morris. 431 P.2d 464, 466 
(Colo. 1967) (en banc); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain. 442 P.2d 
7 
187 (Colo. 1968); Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. 56 N.C. 1, 
286 S.E.2d 810 (1982). 
Certiorari should be granted so this court can clarify the 
applicability of the Civil Practice Rules and to determine whether 
due process of law under the Federal and Utah Constitutions allow 
a party to rely on the Civil Practice Rules being followed as the 
proper means of conducting litigation. 
Another reason why Certiorari should be granted in this issue 
is that the Court of Appeals has ruled the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rules are not binding in an unpublished opinion 
which has no precedential effect. The unpublished opinion denies 
the DeBrys a hearing on the merits of their claim. Certiorari 
should be granted so this court can define in a published opinion 
whether or not the Civil Practice Rules, which were adopted by this 
Court, are procedural rules which bind litigants in the State of 
Utah. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS INAPPROPRIATE 
The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the refusal of the 
trial court to amend its December 11, 1990 order pursuant to Rule 
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In so doing it stated: 
We summarily affirm on the basis that the 
appeal presents no substantial issue for 
review. 
Unpublished Opinion of July 29, 1992 at 1. (Exhibit A) 
Substantial legal issues, including a constitutional claim of 
denial of due process, were presented to the Court of Appeals and 
ignored. This Court should exercise its supervisory power to 
consider the refusal of the Court of Appeals to hear these issues. 
The following substantial issues were presented in the DeBrys* 
appeal in Fidelity II. 
A. Fidelity Obtained the December 11. 1990 Order by Violating 
Specific Procedural Rules. 
The December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit N) was obtained through 
procedural violations of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration as follows: 
1. Violation of Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. provides: 
The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
Following granting of Fidelity's motion for summary judgment, 
Fidelity submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
support the summary judgment. This was a violation of Rule 52(a) 
because findings and conclusions are not proper or necessary to 
support summary judgment. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Co. v. Atkin. Wriaht. & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). This 
uncalled for submission triggered plaintiff to file objections to 
the findings, conclusions and order. 
2. Violations of Rule 4-504f2) Utah Code of Judicial Admin-
istration and Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 4-504(2) provides: 
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(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judg-
ments, and orders shall be served upon 
opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections shall be submit-
ted to the court and counsel within five days 
after service. 
Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines the method of 
calculating the time allowed to carry out requirements of the 
Rules. 
Fidelity violated these rules as follows: The proposed 
findings, conclusions and judgment were delivered to plaintiff 
April 24, 1990 (Exhibits C, J). They were mailed to all other 
counsel April 25, 1990 (Exhibit J). Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), 
using Rule 6 time computations, the last day for filing objections 
to the form of the judgment was May 7, 1992. Fidelity submitted 
the order early in violation of Rule 4-504(2) and Rule 6. The 
judge signed the order prior to the time allowed for objections. 
(Exhibit K). 
Plaintiffs' counsel prepared and signed objections to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 4, 1990 and they 
were filed on Monday, May 7, 1990. (Exhibit L). If Fidelity had 
not violated procedural rules and submitted the order early, no 
question would have arisen as to whether plaintiffs' objections 
were a Rule 52(b) motion. The confusion was created by Fidelity's 
rules violations. 
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3. Violation of Rule 4-504(4) Utah Code of Judicial Admini-
stration. 
Rule 4-504(4) provides: 
(4) Upon entry of judgment notice of such 
judgment shall be served upon the opposing 
party and proof of such service shall be filed 
with the court. All judgments, orders, and 
decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be 
transmitted after signature by the judge, 
including other correspondence requiring a 
reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed 
envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows: 
No notice of entry of judgment was sent to anyone by Fidelity. 
When plaintiffs' objections under Rule 4-504(2) were filed on May 
7, 1990, counsel was unaware of the May 2, signing of the 
judgment. When it was discovered that the judgment had been filed 
May 2, 1990, counsel assumed the Rule 4-504(2) objections were 
moot1 and filed a notice of appeal. 
4. Violation of Rule 4-501(lWb) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides: 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all 
parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If 
the responding party fails to file a memo-
randum in opposition to a motion within ten 
days after service of the motion, the moving 
party may notify the clerk to submit the 
'A pleading filed out of time has no force or effect. See. 
Rivera v. M/T Fossarina. 840 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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matter to the court for decision as provided 
in paragraph (1)(d) of this rule. 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
If in fact the DeBrys1 objections (Exhibit L) were a Rule 
52(b) motion which was opposed by Fidelity, Rule 4-501(1)(b) 
requires a response in opposition within ten days. Fidelity never 
responded. When Fidelity failed to file a written response, it 
waived any right to submit the motion for decision. Violation of 
this rule denied to plaintiff notice that Fidelity thought a Rule 
52(b) motion was pending or that Fidelity opposed such a motion. 
5. Violation of Rule 4-501(1)(d). 
Rule 4-501(1)(d), Code of Judicial Administration provides: 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a 
reply memorandum, either party may notify the 
Clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision. The notification shall be in the 
form of a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
The notification shall contain a certificate 
of mailing to all parties. If neither party 
files a notice, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision. 
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows: 
Assume, arguendo, that a Rule 52(b) motion was pending. If 
Fidelity wanted a ruling, Rule 4-501(1)(d) requires a notice to 
submit for decision. If we assume a violation of Rule 4-501(1)(b) 
did not preclude Fidelity from submitting the motion for decision, 
Fidelity never complied with Rule 4-501(1)(d) which denied notice 
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to DeBrys that Fidelity thought a Rule 52(b) motion was pending or 
under consideration for a decision. 
6. Violations of Rule 4-504(1). 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the 
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall 
within fifteen days, or within a shorter time 
as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
Rule 4-504(1) allows submission of a proposed order only after 
a ruling of the court. Fidelity violated this rule when it 
submitted the December 11, 1990 order for signature. There had 
been no ruling from the court and no request for a ruling. The 
previous rules violations had denied notice to the DeBrys that 
Fidelity thought there was a pending unresolved motion. If the 
DeBrys had been put on such notice, they would have been aware 
response to a Rule 52(b) motion was underway and a new notice of 
appeal could have been timely filed. 
7. Additional Violation of Rule 4-504(4). 
In addition to the violation of Rule 4-504(4) set forth in 
paragraph 3 above, Fidelity again violated Rule 4-504(4) as 
follows: 
Having obtained a signature on the December 11, 1990 order in 
violation of procedural rules as set forth above, Fidelity again 
violated Rule 4-504(4) by not notifying DeBrys of entry of the 
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order. This denied to DeBrys a notice which would have triggered 
the duty to file a new notice of appeal which would have avoided 
dismissal of Fidelity I. 
The numerous flagrant rules violations of Fidelity caused the 
procedural confusion in the case. Being seven months into the 
appeal, counsel was not expecting to receive an ex parte order 
which would require a new notice of appeal to be filed. The small 
mistake in plaintiffs office which denied counsel notice of the 
submission of the December 11, 1990 order, is inconsequential when 
compared to the numerous and continued violations of rules by 
Fidelity in obtaining entry of the December 11, 1990 order. 
Since DeBrys' counsel was unaware of the entry of the December 
11, 1990 order, no new Notice of Appeal was filed in Case No. 
910329. Failure to file a new Notice of Appeal resulted in 
dismissal of case 910329. See, DeBry v. Fidelity National Title 
Co.. 182 Utah Adv.Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992). 
Immediately upon learning of the December 11, 1990 order, 
plaintiffs filed a Rule 60 motion to amend or vacate the order to 
eliminate references to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court denied the motion and this appeal was filed. 
The net result of Fidelity's rules violations was to confer a 
benefit upon Fidelity when Fidelity I was dismissed because of a 
procedural technicality. Thus Fidelity has been greatly rewarded 
for violating procedural rules. 
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Counsel claimed to the trial court that rules violations by 
Fidelity resulted in the DeBrys being denied notices which would 
have put them on notice of Fidelity's concern a Rule 52(b) motion 
was pending. See. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Order 
dated September 27, 1991 at 4-5; and Reply to Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Amend Order dated December 16, 1991 at 4-5. 
(Exhibit E). 
The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals glossed over 
the procedural due process issues raised by petitioner and based 
upon a ruling that the Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rules 
are not binding, granted summary approval to the acts of the trial 
court. 
Certiorari should be granted to allow these due process issues 
to be briefed and decided by this Court. 
B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Refusing to Vacate or 
Amend the December 11. 1990 Order. Due to Fidelity's Proced-
ural Violations and Thereby Denied the DeBrvs Due Process of 
Law. 
Almost seven months after notice of appeal was filed in 
Fidelity I. Fidelity obtained the trial court's signature on the 
December 11, 1990 order. (Exhibit F). This order was the culmi-
nation of numerous specific violations by Fidelity of procedural 
rules. See. Point 11(A), supra. Fidelity's procedural violations 
effectively denied the DeBrys due process of law. Had Fidelity 
followed the procedural rules, DeBrys would have had numerous 
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notices and opportunities to reply to Fidelity's contention that a 
Rule 52(b) motion was pending. However, Fidelity did not follow 
the Rules and DeBrys were denied these notices which resulted in a 
denial of an opportunity to respond. 
In Drurv v. Lunceford. 18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), 
the Supreme Court held that procedural rules: 
[A]re to be liberally construed to effectuate 
justice, nevertheless, they were designed to 
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure 
which the parties and the courts could follow 
and rely upon. 18 Utah 2d at 76. (Emphasis 
added). 
In Lloyd v. Third Judicial District Court, 27 Utah 2d 322, 495 
P.2d 1262 (1972) the Supreme Court defined due process of law as: 
[A] course of legal proceedings according to 
those rules and principles which have been 
established in our systems of jurisprudence 
for the enforcement and protection of private 
rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324. 
The orderly administration of justice (due process) requires 
compliance with procedural rules. Llovd v. Third Judicial District 
Court. supra; Scott v. McNeal. 154 U.S. 34 (1894); Drurv v. 
Lunceford. supra; Mayland v. State. 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977). 
Procedural rules cannot be changed at the whim of the court or a 
party. Mayland v. State, supra. The disregard of procedural rules 
by a trial court cannot be countenanced. Mesa v. Washington State 
Department of Social and Health Services. 683 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 
1982). Appellate courts routinely reverse trial court rulings 
where procedural rules have been ignored or violated. E.g.. Conner 
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v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. 56 N.C. App. 1, 286 S.E.2d 810 (1982) 
review den. 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982); Armstrong v. Lake. 447 N.E.2d 
1153, 1154 (Ind. App. 1983); State v. Turner. 10 Ohio App.3d 328, 
462 N.E.2d 1250 (1983); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain. 442 P.2d 
187 (Colo. 1968) ; Schleininq v. Estate of Morris, supra; Thomas v. 
Children's Hospital Ass'n. 535 P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1975); Motz v. 
Jammaron. 676 P.2d 1211 (Colo. App. 1983). 
A party has a right to rely on application of the rules as 
written and the court has a duty to enforce the rules as written. 
E.g.
 f Drury v. Lunceford, supra; Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain, 
supra; Motz v. Jammaron. supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance 
Co. . supra. Due process of law requires following the regular 
course of proceedings. Simon v. Craft. 182 U.S. 427 (1901). 
In fact, the Colorado Supreme Court sitting en banc stated in 
Schleininq v. Estate of Morris, supra: 
The trial court should have adhered to its own 
published rules. The departure here con-
stituted an abuse of its discretion. 431 P.2d 
at 466. 
Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion when it enters an 
order in violation of procedural rules. Id; see. Armstrong v. 
Lake, supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. supra; Capitol 
Industrial Bank v. Strain, supra. 
The test for reversal in this case is abuse of discretion. 
Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). If it is an abuse 
of discretion to enter an order in violation of procedural rules, 
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then it follows that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
amend or vacate an order entered in violation of procedural rules. 
Schleining v. Estate of Morris, supra. 
By summarily disposing of this appeal based on an issue never 
raised by the parties (i.e., the Code of Judicial Administration is 
non-binding see Point I, supra), the Court of Appeals denied the 
DeBrys the opportunity to brief and argue the due process and abuse 
of discretion issues. The questions of whether the Civil Practice 
Rules of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration are binding rules 
which can be relied upon by counsel in conducting litigation, and 
whether failure to adhere to procedural rules, which failure denies 
notice of a pending proposed order, is a denial of due process of 
law, are substantial questions which should not have been decided 
on summary disposition. Certiorari should be granted to allow 
these issues to be briefed, argued and properly decided by this 
court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO GIVE THIS APPEAL 
THE CONSIDERATION TO WHICH IT IS ENTITLED BY LAW 
This appeal (Fidelity II) is based upon a claim that the trial 
court abused its discretion and denied to the DeBrys due process of 
law when it refused to amend or vacate the December 11, 1990 Order. 
(Exhibit N). 
On its own motion, the Court of Appeals notified the parties 
it was considering summary disposition. (Exhibit P) . Counsel 
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responded informing the court of the substantial due process and 
procedural violations issues extant in the appeal. (Exhibit Q). 
Following this submission, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed 
the trial court in an unpublished opinion dated June 17, 1992. 
(Exhibit H). 
Arguing the June 17, 1992 Opinion (Ex. H) was based upon 
erroneous assumptions, counsel sought a rehearing. (Exhibit R.) 
Upon realizing that the factual basis for their first opinion 
(Exhibit H) was erroneous, the Court of Appeals still refused to 
allow the issues to be briefed and argued. It issued a second 
unpublished opinion on July 29, 1992 (Exhibit A) claiming there 
were no substantial issues presented. Such a holding glosses over 
the substantial constitutional arguments raised by petitioners in 
this appeal. These are: 
1. Refusal to follow procedural rules is a denial of 
due process. Point 11(B) supra; and 
2. The Civil Practice Rules of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration are binding procedural 
rules. Point I, supra. (an issue never raised by 
the parties). 
These issues were not properly briefed. They were never 
argued to the court. In view of the facts set forth herein, a 
statement that there were no substantial issues for review is 
ludicrous. 
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X. 
CONCLUSION 
The unpublished opinion in this case emasculates the Civil 
Practice Rules of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. It 
also denies plaintiffs their constitutional right to have the 
issues raised in their appeal considered following proper briefing 
and argument. The acts of the trial court denied petitioners due 
process of law. A claim of a constitutional violation is not one 
which should be denied on summary disposition. For these reasons, 
Certiorari should be granted in this case. 
DATED this H— day of September, 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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(2) On January 1, 1992, the circuit courts in the 
Fifth. Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Distncts are estab-
lished as district courts in those municipalities where 
the circuit courts currently are located Circuit court 
judges of these judicial districts shall be district court 
judges as of that date Judges of these districts shall 
-tand for unopposed retention election as required by 
law 
(3) The authority of the Judicial Council to replace 
a vacant circuit court judicial position with a court 
lommibsioner position within the limits established 
under Subsection t1) shall expire January 1.1996 
1991 (2nd S.S ) 
78-1-3. Effect of act on election functions. 
11) Any justice or judge of a court of record, whose 
election to office was effective on or before July 1. 
i9S5, shall hold the office for the remainder of the 
term to which he was elected The justice or judge is 
subject to an unopposed retention election as provided 
bv law at the general election immediately preceding 
the expiration of the respective term of office 
12) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose 
appointment to office was effective on or before July 
1 1985. is subject to an unopposed retention election 
as provided by law at the first general election held 
more than three years after the date of the appoint-
ment 
(3) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose 
appointment to office was effective after July 1,1985, 
is subject to an unopposed retention election as pro-
vided by law at the first general election held more 
than three years after the date of the appointment 
1988 
CHAPTER 2 
SUPREME COURT 
Section 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief 
justice and associate chief justice — 
Selection and functions. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1 6 Repealed 
78-2-2 Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78-2-3. Repealed 
78-2-4 Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law 
78-2-5 Repealed 
78-2-6 Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7 Repealed 
78-2-7 5 Service of sheriff to court 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief jus-
tice and associate chief justice — Se-
lection and functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be ap-
pointed initially to serve until the first general elec-
tion held more than three years after the effective 
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office 
of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and 
commences on the first Monday in January following 
the date of election. A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a 
successor is appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a 
chief justice from among the members of the court by 
a majority vote of all justices The term of the office of 
chief justice is four years The chief justice may serve 
successive terms The chief justice may resign from 
the office of chief justice without resigning from the 
Supreme Court The chief justice may be removed 
from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice 
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the asso-
ciate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a 
chief justice is elected under this section If tne asso-
ciate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as 
chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this sec-
tion 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a 
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has 
duties as provided by law 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief jus-
tice The term of office of the associate chief justice is 
two years The associate chief justice mav serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms The 
associate chief justice shall be elected bv a majority 
vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines If 
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice The chief justice may delegate responsibilities 
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law 
1990 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971. 1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over' 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals, 
(el discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with-
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(u) the State Tax Commission, 
(in) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry; 
dv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a cnarge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony, 
d) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
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(4) The Supreme Court mav transfer to the Court 
of Appeals anv of the mat ters o \ e r which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept 
(a) capital felonv convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutor) order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony 
(b> election and voting contests, 
ic) reapport ionment of election districts 
(di retention or removal of public officers, and 
(ei those mat te r s described in Subsections 
(3ua> through (di 
(51 The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
grant ing or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
foi the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it b \ the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b) 
(6 ' The Supreme Court shall compK with the re-
quirements of Title 63 Chapter 46b, in its re \ lew of 
asrencv adjudicative proceedings 1992 
78-2-3. Repea led . 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1i The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
e\ idence adopted bv the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature 
(21 Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
sti tution the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform a m judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States , U t a h residents, and 
admitted to practice lav> in U t a h 
(31 The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of lav., including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admit ted to 
the practice of law 1986 
78-2-5. Repea led . 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished b\ the appellate court administrator and 
powers established b\ rule of the Supreme Court 
1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court. 
The court m a \ at an \ t ime require the a t tendance 
and services of any sheriff in the s ta te 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986. 1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Creation — Seal 
Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
— Filing fees 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
Review of actions b> Supreme Court 
Location of Court of Appeals 
Section 
78-2a-l 
78-2a-2 
78-2a-3 
78-2a-4 
78-2a-5 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap 
peals The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal 1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees 
111 The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three vears after the effective date of 
the appointment Thereafter the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monaav in Januarv, next follow-
ing the date of election A judge whose term expires 
ma> serve upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1 000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served 
(21 The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges Assignment to panel.-, 
shall be bv random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals The Court of Appeals bv rule shall pro 
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms The Court of Appeals mav b\ rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge 
(41 The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge bv majontv vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels, 
(bi act as liaison with the Supreme Court 
(c» call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals, and 
id) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are tne 
same as for the Supreme Court 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(11 The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary 
la) to carry into effect its judgments, orders 
and decrees or 
lb) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission. Board of State Lands, Board of Oil 
Gas, and Mining and the state engineer 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
(D adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12 1, 
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Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipali-
ties are hereby designated as locations of trial courts 
of record: American Fork: Bountiful; Cedar City; 
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton: Murray; Orem; Park 
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; 
West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial 
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may 
hold court in any location designated by this rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, 
supporting memoranda and documents with the 
court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all dis-
trict and circuit courts except proceedings before the 
court commissioners and the small claims depart-
ment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to 
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraor-
dinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memo-
randa. 
la) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, 
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and 
copies of or citations by page number to relevant 
portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Mem-
oranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in para-
graph (2), except as waived by order of the court 
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte applica-
tion is made to file an over-length memorandum, 
the application shall state the length of the prin-
cipal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in 
excess of ten pages, the application shall include 
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed 
five pages. 
ib1 Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a mo-
tion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, 
and all supporting documentation. If the re-
sponding party fails to file a memorandum in op-
position to the motion within ten days after ser-
vice of the motion, the moving party may notify 
the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (lKdi of this 
rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party 
may serve and file a reply memorandum within 
five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk 
to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a separate 
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Sub-
mit for Decision." The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be sub-
mitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
la) Memorandum in support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movant contends no genuine 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a mo-
tion. The points and authorities in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of ma-
terial facts as to which the party contends a gen-
uine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if ap-
plicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. 
All material facts set forth in the movant's state-
ment and properly supported by an accurate ref-
erence to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's state-
ment. • • 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or 
requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b> or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file 
a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to 
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively de-
cided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting 
party that the matter shall be heard and the re-
questing party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and 
time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a 
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered 
to the judge hearing the matter at least two 
working days before the date set for hearing. 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies 
and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk 
of the court. 
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(f) If no written request (or a hearing is made 
at the time the parties file their principal memo-
randa, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(gi All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (301 days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and no-
tice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a 
request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the 
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or 
where the motion does not raise significant legal is-
sues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own 
motion or at a party's request may direct arguments 
of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all 
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if re-
quested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery 
documents. 
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures 
within 30 days of trial. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and 
Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(li Parties conducting discover}' under Rules 33, 
34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
not file discovery requests with the clerk of the court, 
but shall file only the original certificate of service 
stating that the discovery requests have been served 
on the other parties and the date of service. The re-
sponding party shall file a similar certificate with the 
clerk of the court. 
(2) The party serving the discover}' request shall 
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service 
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request 
and proof of service upon the opposing party or coun-
sel. The party responding to the discovery request 
shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of 
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses 
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or 
counsel. The discover}- requests and response shall 
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the 
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown 
so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance 
with a discover}' request or a motion which relies 
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the 
discover}' request or response which is at issue in the 
motion. 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of 
the court for good cause shown. 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discov-
er}' proceedings in accordance with this rule. All dis-
covery proceedings shall be completed, including all 
responses thereto, and all depositions and other docu-
ments filed with the court no later than thirty (30) 
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right 
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the 
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30) 
days before trial shall be presented to the judge as-
signed to the case upon notice to the other parties in 
the action. In exercising its discretion, the coun shall 
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for 
such discover}', the diligence or lack of diligence of 
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permit-
ting such discover}- will prevent the case from going 
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to 
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the 
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by 
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date 
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or 
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of 
the trial date. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
and requesting jury instructions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and 
Justice Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented 
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in 
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury in-
structions at any time prior to the submission of the 
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the 
court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be 
furnished to opposing counsel. 
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing 
and state in full the instruction requested. Each re-
quest shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
original and copies of which shall be free from red 
lines and (Irm names and shall be entitled: 
"Instruction No. " 
The number of the request shall be written in lead 
pencil. 
(3) If case citations are used in support of a re-
quested instruction, at least one copy of the requested 
instruction, furnished to the court shall be submitted 
without the citations. Citations may be provided upon 
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction 
to which the citation applies. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and de-
crees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting 
written orders, judgments, and decrees to the court. 
This rule is not intended to change existing law with 
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in 
courts of record except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the parry 
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen 
days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct, 
file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or de-
cree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and 
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before 
being presented to the court for signature unless the 
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within five days 
after service. 
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(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall 
also be reduced to writing and presented to the court 
for signature within fifteen days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judg-
ment shall be served upon the opposing party and 
proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, 
which are to be transmitted after signature by the 
judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes 
and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be pre-
pared in such a manner as to show whether they are 
entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the motion of 
counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall 
identify the attorneys of record in the cause or pro-
ceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is 
made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments 
and decrees shall contain the address or the last 
known address of the judgment debtor and the social 
security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as 
separate documents and shall not include any mat-
ters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees 
may be made a part of the documents containing the 
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon 
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the stip-
ulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of record 
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or 
the stipulation was made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a 
written obligation to pay money and a judgment has 
previously been rendered upon the same written obli-
gation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach 
to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments 
based upon the same written obligation. 
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit 
the power of any court, upon a proper showing, to 
enforce a settlement agreement or any other agree-
ment which has not been reduced to writing. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format 
for affidavits in support of attorneys' fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees 
in the trial courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' 
fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifi-
cally the legal basis for the award, the nature of the 
work performed by the attorney, the number of hours 
spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time 
spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which 
attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reason-
ableness of the fees for comparable legal services. 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours 
by persons other than attorneys, for time spent, work 
completed and hourly rate billed. 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a prin-
cipal sum which it is expected will require consider-
able additional work to collect, the following phrase 
may be included in the judgment after an award con-
sistent with the time spent to the point of default 
judgment, to cover additional fees incurred in pursuit 
of collection: 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT 
THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE AUG-
MENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASON-
ABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID 
JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHER-
WISE AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY 
AFFIDAVIT." 
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be 
awarded except as they conform to the provisions of 
this rule and to state statute and case law. 
(Amended effective January 15. 1990.) 
Rule 4-505.1. Awards of attorneys' fees in civil 
default judgments with a principal 
amount of $5,000 or less. 
Intent: 
To provide for uniformity in awards of attorneys' 
fees in civil default judgments with a principal 
amount of 55,000 or less. 
To provide for notice of the amount of attorneys' 
fees that may be awarded in the event of default. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern awards of attorneys' fees in 
civil default judgments with a principal amount of 
$5,000 or less in which the claimant elects to seek an 
award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) When reasonable attorneys' fees are provided 
for by contract or statute and the claimant elects to 
seek an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule, 
such fees shall be computed as follows: 
Principal Amount of Attorneys' Fees 
Judgment, Allowed 
Exclusive of Costs, 
Between: 
$ 0.00 
700.01 
900.01 
1,000.01 
1,500.01 
2,000.01 
2.500.01 
3,000.01 
3,500.01 
4,000.01 
4,500.01 
S 700.00 
900.00 
1,000.00 
1.500.00 
2,000.00 
2.500.00 
3,000.00 
3.500.00 
4.000.00 
4.500.00 
5,000.00 
$150.00 
175.00 
200.00 
250.00 
325.00 
400.00 
475.00 
550.00 
625.00 
700.00 
775.00 
(2) Reference to this rule and the amount of attor-
neys' fees allowed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be 
stated with particularity in the body or prayer of the 
complaint. 
(3) When a statute provides the basis for the award 
of attorneys' fees, reference to the statutory authority 
shall be included in the complaint. 
(4) Clerks may enter civil default judgments which 
include attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(5) Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule 
may be augmented after judgment pursuant to Rule 
4-505. When the court considers a motion for aug-
mentation of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this 
rule, it shall consider the attorneys' time spent prior 
to the entry of judgment, the amount of attorneys' 
fees included in the judgment, and the statements 
contained in theaffidavit supporting the motion for 
augmentation. 
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attor-
neys' fees pursuant to this rule, any party may move 
the court to depart from the fees allowed by para-
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graph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made 
pursuant to Rule 4-505. 
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an 
award of attorneys' fees, an original or copy of the 
document shall be made a part of the file before attor-
neys' fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(81 No affidavit for attorneys' fees need be filed in 
order to receive an award of attorneys' fees pursuant 
to this rule. 
(Added effective March 31, 1992.' 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for 
withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceed-
ings in trial courts of record except guardians ad 
litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record 
without the approval of the court except when la) a 
motion has been filed and is pending before the court 
or (b) a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. 
Under these circumstances, an attorney may not 
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of 
record, written notice of the withdrawal must be 
served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney 
and upon all other parties not in default and a certifi-
cate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial 
date has been set. the notice of withdrawal served 
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial 
date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or sus-
pended or withdraws from the case or ceases to act as 
an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, in writing, 
the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to 
retain another attorney or appear in person before 
opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings 
against the client. A copy of the writ-en notice shall 
be filed with the court and no furtner proceedings 
shall be held in the matter until 20 days have elapsed 
from the date of filing. 
(Amended effective Januarv 15. 1990: April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee's 
sale. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee 
affidavits of deposit and claimant petitions for adjudi-
cation of priority in trustee's sales. 
To establish a uniform procedure in determining 
the disposition of funds on trustee's sales. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the 
Court any proceeds from a trustee's sale in accor-
dance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the 
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting 
forth the facts of the deposit and a list of all known 
claimants, including known addresses. The clerk 
shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of 
receiving the affidavit of deposit. 
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adju-
dication of priority to these funds and request a hear-
ing before the court. The petitioner requesting the 
hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claim-
ants listed in the trustee's affidavit of deposit and any 
others known to the petitioner. All persons having or 
claiming an interest must appear and assert their 
claim or be barred thereafter. 
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the 
court will establish the priorities of the parties to the 
trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with the 
clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the 
disbursement of funds as determined. 
Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform standard for the use of 
unpublished opinions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not 
of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have 
no precedential value and shall not be cited or used in 
the courts of this state, except for purposes of apply-
ing the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or 
collateral estoppel. 
(Added effective January 15, 1990.) 
ARTICLE 6. 
CRIMINAL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-601. Victims and witnesses. 
Intent-
To establish procedures which ensure that victims 
and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, re-
spect, courtesy, and sensitivity. 
To establish procedures which ensure that child 
victims and child witnesses of crime are treated with 
consideration for their age and maturity and in a 
manner that is the least traumatic, intrusive or in-
timidating. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the judiciary, prosecutors, 
defense counsel, and law enforcement and corrections 
personnel in all felony cases in and all misdemeanor 
cases where personal injury is sustained by the vic-
tim. This rule also applies to all individuals who have 
been subpoenaed or called to testify as witnesses in 
any criminal proceeding. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary 
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prose-
cuting agency shall provide written verification to 
the court that all victims and subpoenaed witnesses 
have been informed of their responsibilities during 
the criminal proceedings and that those proceedings 
have been explained to them in a manner which is 
understandable, given the age and maturity of the 
victims and witnesses. 
(2) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary 
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prose-
cuting agency shall provide written verification to 
the court that all victims and subpoenaed witnesses 
have been informed of their right to be free from 
threats, intimidation and harm by anyone seeking to 
induce the victim or witness to testify falsely, with-
hold testimony or information, avoid legal process, or 
secure the dismissal of or prevent the filing of a crim-
inal complaint, indictment or information. At that 
time and where facilities are available, the prosecut-
ing agency shall provide written verification to the 
court that the victims and witnesses have been in-
formed of their right to a separate waiting area. 
(3) Unless otherwise waived in writing, the prose-
cuting agency shall provide notice to all victims of the 
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transfer the case, including the record and file of 
the case from the trial court, all papers filed in 
the Court of Appeals, and a written statement of 
all docket entries in the case up to and including 
the certification order, to the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court The Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk of 
the trial court that the case has been transferred. 
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification, 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall enter the 
appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court 
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall immedi-
ately send notices to all parties and to the clerk 
of the trial court that the case has been docketed 
and that all further filings will be made with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court. The notice shall 
state the docket number assigned to the case in 
the Supreme Court. The case shall proceed before 
the Supreme Court to final decision and disposi-
tion as in other appellate cases pursuant to these 
rules 
14) If the record on appeal has not been filed 
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the 
date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial 
court that upon completion of the conditions for 
filing the record by that court, the clerk shall 
transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court If, however, the record on appeal 
has already been transmitted to and filed with 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the date of 
the entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals shall transmit the record on 
appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 
five days of the date of the entry of the order of 
transfer, 
(c) Criteria for transfer. The Court of Appeals 
shall consider certification only in the following 
cases 
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is 
apparent that the case should be decided by the 
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court 
would probably grant a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari in the case if decided by the Court of Ap-
peals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals 
might rule, and 
(2) Cases which will govern a number of other 
cases involving the same legal issue or issues 
pending in the district courts, juvenile courts, cir-
cuit courts, or the Court of Appeals or which are 
cases of first impression under state or federal 
law which will have wide applicability. 
Rule 44. Transfer of improperly pursued ap-
peals. 
If a notice of appeal or a petition for review is filed 
in a timely manner but is pursued in an appellate 
court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the 
appellate court, either on its own motion lor) on mo-
tion of any party, shall transfer the case, including 
the record on appeal, all motions and other orders, 
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with 
appellate jurisdiction in the case. The clerk of the 
transferring court shall give notice to all parties and 
to the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring 
the case The time for filing all papers in a trans-
ferred case shall be calculated according to the time 
schedule of the receiving court. 
TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO COURT 
OF APPEALS. 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and de-
crees of Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a 
judgment, an order, and a decree therein referred to 
as "decisions"} of the Court of Appeals shall be initi-
ated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of Utah 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of 
certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only for special and important reasons The following, 
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of 
reasons that will be considered 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law, 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a 
way that is in conflict with a decision of the Su-
preme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by 
a lower court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision, or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
the Supreme Court. 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of 
record; filing; parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and ser-
vice. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time 
provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing fee 
and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in 
all respects with Rule 49 The case then will be placed 
on the certiorari docket Counsel for the petitioner 
shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for 
each party separately represented. It shall be the 
duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties 
in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari 
docket number of the case. Service and notice shall be 
given as required by Rule 21. 
(bi Joint and separate petitions. Parties inter-
ested jointly, severally, or otherwise in a decision 
may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two 
or more of them may join in a petition. When two or 
more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it 
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certio-
rari covering all the cases. 
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a 
respondent wishing to file a cross-petition shall, 
within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certi-
orari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari which shall comply in all 
respects with Rule 49. The cross-petition will then be 
placed on the certiorari docket Counsel for the cross-
petitioner shall serve four copies of the cross-petition 
on counsel for each party separately represented. It 
shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to 
notify all parties in the case of the date of the filing 
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and of the certiorari docket number of the case Ser-
vice and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21 
A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be 
joined with any other filing, the clerk shall not accept 
any filing so joined 
(d) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the 
Court of Appeals shall be deemed parties in the Su-
preme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's 
belief that one or more of the parties below have no 
interest in the outcome of the petition A copy of such 
notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding 
below, and a party noted as no longer interested may 
remain a party by notifying the clerk, with »ervice on 
the other parties, that the party has an interest in the 
petition 
le) Motion for certification and transmission of 
record. A party intending to file a petition for certio-
rari, prior to filing the petition or at any time prior to 
action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file 
a motion for an order to have the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals or the clerk of the trial court certify the 
record, or any part of it. and provide for its transmis-
sion to the Supreme Court Motions to certify the 
record prior to action on the petition b\ the Supreme 
Court should rarely be made, only when the record is 
essential to the Supreme Court's proper understand-
ing of the petition or the brief in opposition and such 
understanding cannot be derived from the contents of 
the petition or the brief in opposition, including the 
appendix If a motion is appropriate, it shall be made 
to the Supreme Court after the filing of a petition but 
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition 
In the case of a stay of execution of a judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, such a motion may be made before 
the filing of the petition Thereafter, the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court or am party to the case may request 
that additional parts of the record be certified and 
transmitted to the Supreme Court Copies of all mo-
tions for certification and transmission shall be sent 
to the parties to the proceeding All motions and or-
ders shall comply with and be subject to the require-
ments of Rule 23. 
Rule 48. Time for petitioning. 
(ai Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of 
certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court within 30 days after the entry of the decision 
by the Court of Appeals 
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to 
receive any petition for a writ of certiorari which is 
jurisdictionallv out of time 
(ci Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for 
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the 
date the decision is entered by the Court of Appeals, 
not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If. 
however, a petition for rehearing is timely filed by 
any party, the time for filing the petition for a writ of 
certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the 
denial of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent 
decision entered upon the rehearing 
ld> Time for cross-petition. 
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari 
must be filed 
(A) within the time provided in subdivi-
sions (a/ and (c> of this rule, or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to 
paragraph (d)(1)(B) of this rule will not be 
granted unless a timely petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari of another party to the case is granted. 
lei Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause. ma\ ex-
tend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition 
for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later 
than 30 davs after the expiration of the time pre-
scribed by paragraph iai or (c> of this rule, whichever 
is applicable Any such motion which is filed before 
expiration of the prescribed time maj be ex parte 
unless the Supreme Court otherwise requires Notice 
of any such motion which is filed after expiration of 
the prescribed time shall be given to the other par-
ties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the pre-
scribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the 
order granting the motion, whichever occurs later 
Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
(a i Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari 
shall contain, in the order indicated 
(DA list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed, 
except where the caption of the case in the Su-
preme Court contains the names of all parties. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabeti-
callv arranged and with parallel citations, 
agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authori-
ties cued, with references to the pages of the peti-
tion where they are cited 
(4) The questions presented for review, ex-
pressed in the terms and circumstances of the 
case but without unnecessary detail The state-
ment of the questions should be short and concise 
and should not be argumentative or repetitious 
General conclusions, such as "the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is not supported b> the law or 
facts." are not acceptable The statement of a 
question presented will be deemed to comprise 
every subsidiary question fairly included therein 
Only the questions set forth in the petition or 
fairly included therein will be considered by the 
Supreme Court 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial re-
ports of any opinions issued by the Court of Ap-
peals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on 
which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is 
invoked, showing 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision 
sought to be reviewed. 
iBi the date of the entry of any order re-
specting a rehearing and the date of the 
entry and terms of any order granting an 
extension of time within which to petition for 
certiorari; 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c). where a 
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari is filed, 
stating the filing date of the petition for a 
writ of certiorari in connection with which 
the cross-petition is filed, and 
(Di the statutory provision believed to 
confer on the Supreme Court jurisdiction to 
review the decision in question by a writ of 
certiorari. 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, 
statutes, ordinances, and regulations that the 
case involves, setting them out verbatim and giv-
ing the appropriate citation If the controlling 
provisions involved are lengthy, their citation 
alone will suffice at this point and their pertinent 
text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to 
in subparagraph (10) of this paragraph. 
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<8i A statement of the case. The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of the proceedings, and its disposition 
in the lower courts There shall follow a state-
ment of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review All statements of fact and references 
to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record and to the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a 
direct and concise argument exp'ainmg the spe-
cial and important reasons as provided in Rule 
46 for the issuance of the writ. 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following 
order. 
t A) copies of all opinions, including con-
curring and dissenting opinions, and all or-
ders including any order on rehearing, de-
livered by the Court of Appeals in rendering 
the decision sought to be reviewed; 
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, orders, judgments, 
or decrees that were rendered in the case or 
in companion cases by the Court of Appeals 
and by other courts or by administrative 
agencies and that are relevant to the ques-
tions presented Each document shall in-
clude the caption showing the name of the 
issuing court or agency, the title and number 
of the case, and the date of its entry; and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative 
opinions or orders that are relevant to the 
questions presented but were not entered in 
the case that is the subject of the petition 
If the material that is required by subparagraphs 
(7) and (10) of this paragraph is voluminous, such 
may, if more convenient, be separately presented 
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall comply with the form of a bnef as 
specified in Rule 27 The cover of the petition shall be 
white The clerk shall examine all petitions before 
filing, and if a petition is not prepared in accordance 
with Rule 27 and this paragraph, it will not be filed, 
but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support 
of a petition for a writ of certiorari shall be set forth 
in the body of the petition, as provided in subpara-
graph (aK9) of this rule. No separate bnef in support 
of a petition for a writ of certiorari will be received, 
and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a writ 
of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any 
supporting brief 
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari shall be as short as possible, but may not ex-
ceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table 
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by 
subparagraph (a)(7) of this rule, and the appendix. 
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. 
The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, 
brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
and adequate understanding of the points requiring 
consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying 
the petition. 
Rule 50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of 
amicus curiae. 
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall 
have 30 days after service of a petition in which to file 
ten copies of an opposing bnef, disclosing any matter 
or ground why the case should not be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court. Such brief shall comply with the re-
quirements of Rule 49, as applicable, and comply 
with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27 The 
cover of the brief shall be orange. The clerk snail 
examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not 
prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and with the 
proper cover it will not be filed, but shall be returned 
to be properly prepared Four copies of the brief snail 
be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each 
party separately represented 
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be 
as short as possible and may not. ,n any single cat-e. 
exceed 20 pages, excluding the subiect index, the fa-
ble of authorities, anv verbatim auotations required 
by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix. 
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a re-
spondent to dismiss a petition for a writ of certiorari 
will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction ot the 
Supreme Court to grant the writ of certiorari may be 
included in the brief in opposition 
id) Distribution of filings. Upon the film? ot a 
brief in opposition, the expiration ot the time allowed 
therefor, or express waiver of the nght to file, the 
petition and the brief, if anv. will be disuibuted bv 
the clerk for consideration However, if a cross-peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari has been filed, distribution 
of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will 
be delaved until the filing of a brief in opposition bv 
the cross-respondent, the expiration of the time al-
lowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file 
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to argu-
ments first raised in the brief in opposition mav be 
filed by any petitioner, but distribution under para-
graph (dl of this rule wiil not be delayed pending the 
filing of any such brief. Such brief snail be as short as 
possible, but may not exceed five pages Such brief 
shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in 
Rule 27 The cover of the brief shall be yellow The 
clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a 
brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and 
with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but snail be 
returned to be properly prepared Ten copies of the 
brief shall be filed, and four copies snail be served as 
prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party sepa-
rately represented. 
(f) Bnef of amicus curiae. A bnef of an amicus 
curiae may be filed only if accompanied by written 
consent of all parties, by leave of the Supreme Court 
granted on motion, or at the request of the Supreme 
Court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of 
the applicant and shall state the reasons whv a briet 
of an amicus cunae is desirable Except as all parties 
otherwise consent, an amicus curiae shall file its brief 
within the time allowed the party whose position it 
will support, unless the Supreme Court for cause 
shown shall grant leave for later filing, in which 
event it shall specify within what period an opposing 
party may answer. Such brief shall comply with the 
requirements of Rule 49. as applicable, and comply 
with the form of briefs as specified in Rule 27 The 
cover of the brief shall be green. The orief mav not 
exceed 20 pages, excluding the subiect index, the ta-
ble of authorities, any verbatim quotations required 
by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix Ten copies of the 
brief shall be filed, and four copiei shall be served as 
prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party sepa-
rately represented. 
Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certi-
orari. 
(a) Order after consideration. After consider-
ation of the documents distributed pursuant to Rule 
50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying 
the petition or granting the petition in whole or in 
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part. The order shall be decided summarily, shall be 
without oral argument, and shall not constitute a de-
cision on the merits. 
(bl Grant of petition. Whenever an order grant-
ing a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of record. 
The case then will stand for briefing and oral argu-
ment. If the record has not previously been filed, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall request the Clerk of 
the Court of Appeals to certify it and transmit it to 
the Supreme Court. A formal writ shall not issue un-
less specially directed. 
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a 
writ of certiorari is denied, an order to that effect will 
be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court forth-
with will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of 
record. 
FORMS 
FORM 
1. Notice of Appeal. 
2. Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. 
3. Affidavit of Impecuniosity. 
4. Request for Transcript. 
5. Acknowledgment of Receipt of Request for Tran-
script; Motion for Enlargement of Time. 
6. Certificate That No Transcript is Required. 
7. Docketing Statement. 
8. Checklist for Briefs — Rules 24, 26, and 27. 
9. Checklist for Petitions for Certiorari — Rules 45 
through 51. 
10. Certificate of Service [9]. 
11. Petition for Writ of Review. 
Explanatory Notes for Appellate Forms 
Form 1. Notice of Appeal 
Attorney Name 
Address 
Phone Number 
Bar Number 
IN THE [TRIAL COURT] 
OF THE [NUMBER] JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
A.B., ) NOTICE OF 
APPEAL [1] 
Plaintiff and t 
[Appellant] [Appellee] i Trial Court No. 
vs. ) 
CD., 
Defendant and ) 
[Appellee] [Appellant] > 
(1) Notice is hereby given that [plaintiff] [defen-
dant] and appellant. (name) 
[through counsel. (name' ,] appeals 
to the Utah [Supreme Court] [Court of Appeals] the 
final [judgment] [order] of the Honorable 
(name) entered in this matter on 
(date) . 
(2a) The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
[OR] 
(2b i The appeal is taken from such part of the judg-
ment that states that 
(signature) 
Reference.? 
Utah R. App P. 3(a); 3(c); 3id); 3(f); 4: 40(a) 
Form 2. Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
Attorney Name 
Address 
Phone Number 
Bar Number 
IN THE UTAH [SUPREME COURT] [COURT OF 
APPEALS] 
A.B., 
Plaintiff and 
[Petitioner] 
[Respondent] 
vs. 
CD., 
Defendant and 
[Respondent] 
[Petitioner] 
(1) (Name) 
PETITION FOR PERMIS-
SION TO APPEAL 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
(name) 
Trial Court No. 
through counsel, 
petitions the Utah [Su-
preme Court] [Court of Appeals] to permit an appeal 
from the interlocutory order of the Honorable 
(name1 entered in this matter on 
(date) 
(2) A copy of the order sought to be reviewed land 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and opinion of the 
trial court] [is] [are] attached. 
(31 STATEMENT OF FACTS: (Provide a state-
ment of the facts necessary to an understanding of 
the question(s) of law determined by the order sought 
to be reviewed.) 
(41 QUESTIONS OF LAW: (Provide a statement of 
the question(s) of law determined by the order sought 
to be reviewed.) 
(5) ISSUE RAISED IN TRIAL COURT: (Provide a 
demonstration that each question was properly pre-
sented to the trial court judge.) 
(6' IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY: (Provide 
a statement of the reasons why an immediate appeal 
of the question(s) of law should be permitted.) 
(7) ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION: 
(provide a statement of the reasons why the appeal 
will materially advance the termination of the litiga-
tion, i 
(signature) 
Attorney of Record [2] 
References 
Utah R. App. P. 3(c); 3(d); 5(a): 5(c); 40(a) 
Form 3. Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Individual Name 
Address 
Phone Number 
I,. (name) , do solemnly [swear] [affirm] 
Attorney of Record [2] 
that owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the 
expenses of the appeal which I am about to take and 
that I believe I am entitled to the relief sought by 
such appeal. 
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other 
papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise 
provided in these rules, every order required by its 
terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the 
original complaint unless the court otherwise orders 
because of numerous defendants, even' paper relat-
ing to discovery required to be served upon a party 
unless the court otherwise orders, every written mo-
tion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
everj' written notice, appearance, demand, offer of 
judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment un-
der Rule 58Aid), and similar paper shall be served 
upon each of the parties. No service need be made on 
parties in default for failure to appear except as pro-
vided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or plead-
ings asserting new or additional claims for relief 
against them which shall be served upon them in the 
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether 
through arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar 
process, in which no person need be or is named as 
defendant, any service required to be made prior to 
the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be 
made upon the person having custody or possession of 
the property at the time of its seizure. 
(bi Service: How made. 
! 11 Whenever under these rules service is re-
quired or permitted to be made upon a party rep-
resented by an attorney the service shall be made 
upon the attorney unless service upon the party 
himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the 
attorney or upon a party shall be made by deliv-
ering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his 
known address or, if no address is known, by 
leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of 
a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the 
attorney or to the party; or leaving it at his office 
with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; 
or. if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a 
conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is 
closed or the person to be served has no office, 
leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and dis-
cretion then residing therein. Service by mail is 
complete upon mailing. 
(2i A resident attorney, on whom pleadings 
and other papers may be served, shall be associ-
ated as attorney of record with any foreign attor-
ney practicing in any of the courts of this state. 
ic i Service: Numerous defendants. In any action 
in which there are unusually large numbers of defen-
dants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, 
may order that service of the pleadings of the defen-
dants and replies thereto need not be made as be-
tween the defendants and that any cross-claim, coun-
terclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense contained therein shall be deemed to 
be denied or avoided by all other parties and that the 
filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon 
the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. 
A copy of every such order shall be served upon the 
parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
td) Filing. All papers after the complaint required 
to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court 
either before service or within a reasonable time 
thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party 
or on its own initiative order that depositions, inter-
rogatories, requests for documents, requests for ad-
mission, and answers and responses thereto not be 
filed unless on order of the court or for use in the 
nrnrppHinp. 
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of 
pleadings and other papers with the court as required 
by these rules shall be made by filing them with the 
clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit 
the papers to be filed with him, in which event he 
shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith trans-
mit them to the office of the clerk, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time 
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local 
rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default 
from which the designated period of time begins to 
run shall not be included. The last day of the period 
so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the pe-
riod runs until the end of the next day which is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the 
period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal hol-
idays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a no-
tice given thereunder or by order of the court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its 
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order 
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or 
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion 
made after the expiration of the specified period per-
mit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the 
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b). 
59(b), Id) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g). except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period 
of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking 
of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the 
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. 
The continued existence or expiration of a term of 
court in no way affects the power of a court to do any 
act or take any proceeding in any civil action which 
has been pending before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, 
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later 
than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, 
unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by 
order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown 
be made on ex parte application. When a motion is 
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served 
with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in 
Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not 
later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court 
permits them to be served at some other time. 
<e) Additional time after service by mail. When-
ever a party has the right or is required to do some 
act or take some proceedings within a prescribed pe-
riod after the service of a notice or other paper upon 
him and the notice or paper is served upon him by 
mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
PART III. 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS. 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; form of motions. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an 
answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as 
such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer con-
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the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
la) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the find-
ings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded in open court following the close of the evi-
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de-
cision filed by the court. The trial court need not en-
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b). 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The mo-
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur-
suant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find-
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either 
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial. 
Ic) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties 
to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial: 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in 
the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1. 1987.) 
Rule 53. Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all 
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court 
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or 
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this 
rule. As used in these rules the word "master" in-
cludes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The 
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed 
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the 
parlies or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the 
action, which is in the custody and control of the 
court as the court may direct. The master shall not 
retain his report as security for his compensation; but 
when the party ordered to pay the compensation al-
lowed by the court does not pay it after notice and 
within the time prescribed by the court, the master is 
entitled tc. a writ of execution against the delinquent 
party. 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the 
exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a 
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues 
are complicated: in actions to be tried without a jury. 
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the 
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made 
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition 
requires it. 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master 
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to 
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only 
and may fix the time and place for beginning and 
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's 
report. Subject to the specifications and limitations 
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise 
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hear-
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mea-
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor-
mance of his duties under the order. He may require 
the production before him of evidence upon all mat-
ters embraced in the reference, including the produc-
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and 
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the 
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by 
the order of reference and has the authority to put 
witnesses on oath and may himself examine them 
and may call the parties to the action and examine 
them upon oath. When a party so requests, the mas-
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered and 
excluded in the same manner and subject to the same 
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence 
for a court sitting without a jury. 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the 
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a 
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt 
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise 
provides, the master shall forthwith set a time 
and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after 
the date of the order of reference and shall notify 
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the 
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence. 
Either party, on notice to the parties and master, 
may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
master to speed the proceedings and to make his 
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and 
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a 
future day, giving notice to the absent party of 
the adjournment. 
(21 Witnesses. The parties may procure the 
attendance of witnesses before the master by the 
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in 
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness 
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be pun-
ished as for a contempt and be subjected to the 
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided 
in Rules 37 and 45. 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of 
accounting are in issue before the master, he 
may prescribe the form in which the accounts 
shall be submitted and in any proper case may-
require or receive in evidence a statement by a 
certified public accountant who is called as a wit-
ness. Upon objection of a party to any of the 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
form of statement is insufficient, the master may 
require a different form of statement to be fur-
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nished. or the accounts or specific items thereof 
to be proved by oral examination of the account-
ing parties or upon written interrogatories or in 
such other manner as he directs. 
ie) Report. 
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall 
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to 
him by the order of reference and. if required to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he 
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file 
the report with the clerk of the court and in an 
action to be tried without a jury, unless other-
wise directed by the order of reference, shall file 
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the 
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk 
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the 
filing. 
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be 
tried without a jury the court shall accept the 
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 
Within 10 days after being served with notice of 
the filing of the report any party may serve writ-
ten objections thereto upon the other parties. Ap-
plication to the court for action upon the report 
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion 
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6<d). The 
court after hearing may adopt the report or may 
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or 
mav receive further evidence or may recommit it 
with instructions. 
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by 
a jury' the master shall not be directed to report 
the evidence. His findings upon the issues sub-
mitted to him are admissible as evidence of the 
matters found and may be read to the jury, sub-
ject to the ruling of the court upon any objections 
in point of law which may be made to the report. 
(4i Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a 
master's report is the same whether or not the 
parties have consented to the reference; but. 
when the parties stipulate that a master's find-
ings of fact shall be final, only questions of law 
arising upon the report shall thereafter be con-
sidered. 
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a 
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for 
all parties for the purpose of receiving their sug-
gestions. 
(fi Objections to appointment of master. A 
party may object to the appointment of any person as 
a master on the same grounds as a party may chal-
lenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial 
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and 
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a 
motion. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(ai Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these 
rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. 
(bi Judgment upon multiple claims and/or in-
volving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
to Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, even-
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants: and it may, when 
the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as be-
tween or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by de-
fault shall not be different in kind from, or ex-
ceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. 
id) Costs. 
11 > To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs;, provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
I2I How assessed. The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may. within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in which the judgment was ren-
dered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(31, i4i [Deleted. 1 
(et Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
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the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions ana in the 
judgment docket 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985 ) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the 
entry of the default of any partv. as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(al. in Rule 58A(di or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party 
(b) Judgment. Judgment b> default may be en-
tered as follow , 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personal!} served 
otherwise than bv publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person 
(2) By the court. In all other cases tne party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apph to 
the court therefor If, in order to enable the court 
to enter )udgment or to cam' it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment b\ evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter the court mav con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b) 
(d> Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
parn entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a partv who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54lcl 
(el Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court 
(Amended effective Sept 4. 1985 ) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
lai For claimant. A parn seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declarator}.-judgment ma;. at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cros«-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is soujrht. mav, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
man' judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof 
ic) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in cnaracter, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits: further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule an adverse partv mav not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
thi» rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him 
(fi When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a partv opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just 
igi Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the partv em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and am offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilt} of contempt 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 500 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against 
(4) Newl\ discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law 
(7) Error in law 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the applica-
tion for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), 
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported bv affidavit 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affi-
davits they shall be served with the motion The op-
posing party has 10 days after such sen-ice within 
which to serve opposing affidavits The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation The 
court may permit reply affidavits 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
ma\ order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new'tnal on motion of a party, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any. as the court orders During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(bi Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b), (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party, (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by-
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application, or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (li, (2), (3). 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a partv from a judgment order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court The procedure for obtaining anv relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judg-
ment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the security of the adverse party as are proper, other-
wise directs 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judg-
ment. In its discretion ana on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of or any proceedings to en-
force, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion 
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made 
pursuant to Rule 59. or of a motion for relief from a 
judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60. or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for 
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50. or of a 
motion for amendment to the findings or for addi-
tional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b) 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal 
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment 
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion mav suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the 
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for 
the security of the rights of the adverse party 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken 
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond mav ob-
tain a stav. unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited 
by law or these rules The bond may be given at or 
after the time of filing the notice of appeal The stay-
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the court 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. 
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the 
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by 
direction of any department of either, and the opera-
tion or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no 
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where 
the defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intrud-
ing into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or 
military, within this state the execution of the judg-
ment shall not be stayed on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The 
provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an 
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PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Both parties have filed memoranda in 
response to the motion. We summarily affirm on the basis that 
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review. 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (Fidelity). On 
April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to appellants' counsel. 
The findings were mailed to all other counsel on April 25, 1990. 
On May 2, 1990, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment to the trial court, and the court 
signed the findings, conclusions, and judgment. 
1. This replaces the decision in this case filed on June 17, 
1992. 
Five days after the judgment was entered, appellants filed 
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law." The document objected to the 
findings and conclusions and asserted that specific additional 
findings and conclusions should be made. On May 22, 1990, 
appellants filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's May 2 
order granting summary judgment. On December 11, 1990, the trial 
court characterized appellants' objections as a Rule 52(b) motion 
and denied the motion. Appellants did not file a notice of 
appeal from the December 11, 1990 order. As a result, this court 
dismissed appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the 
basis that appellants failed to file a new notice of appeal after 
the court denied appellants Rule 52(b) motion. DeBrv v. Fidelity 
National Title Ins. Co.. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. March 
18, 1992) (Fidelity I). On October 21, 1991, after the briefs 
were filed in Fidelity I and before it was argued, appellants 
filed a motion to amend the December 11, 1990 order and 
supporting memoranda. The court denied the motion, and 
appellants filed this appeal. 
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated seven 
procedural rules in obtaining the December 11, 1990 order. Thus, 
they claim the trial court erred in denying their motion to amend 
the December 11, 1990 order. Only two of the alleged procedural 
irregularities were raised before the trial court-. We therefore 
limit our discussion to those issues that were before the court. 
First, appellants requested the trial court to delete references 
to Rule 52(b) in the order of December 11, 1990 because Fidelity 
sought dismissal of the appeal based on that language. Second, 
appellants claimed that the order was entered in violation of 
Rule 4-501(1)(d) because Fidelity did not file a "Notice to 
Submit for Decision." . 
In Fidelity I this court addressed the first argument and 
held that the trial court did not err in disposing of the 
objections as a Rule 52(b) motion. We therefore reject that 
claim. 
With regard to the second argument, Rule 4-501(1)(d) 
provides 
Upon expiration of the five-day period to 
file a reply memorandum, either party may 
notify the Clerk to submit the matter for 
decision. The notification shall be in the 
form of a separate written pleading and 
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
The notification shall contain a certificate 
of mailing to all parties. If neither party 
files a notice, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision. 
Rule 4-501 is an administrative rule enacted by the Utah 
Judicial Council pursuant to its governance over the courts. The 
rule does not rise to the level of a rule of procedure. Rather, 
the mandatory language is intended to provide guidance to the 
clerk's office and to put attorneys and litigants on notice in 
the strongest possible terms that without affirmative action in 
the form of a notice to submit, they have no right to expect 
matters to come to the court's attention. Where the court, 
notwithstanding the absence of a "Notice to Submit for Decision," 
perceives that a matter is ready for decision and deoides a 
matter, the parties merely benefit from having the decision more 
quickly than they were entitled to expect. In addition, the rule 
does not contemplate objections or responses to the notice, thus 
there is no prejudice if the decision is rendered without the 
"Notice to Submit for Decision." Accordingly, we find that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 
amend on this basis. 
We summarily affirm on the basis that the appeal presents no 
substantial issue for review. Utah R. App. P. 10(c). We decline 
to award attorney fee£ on appeal. 
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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INS., CO. 
Defendant/Respondent. 
O R D E R 
Case No. 920269-CA 
Based upon motion of petitioners and stipulation of 
counsel and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioners may have to and 
including Tuesday, September 8, 1992 to file a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari in the above case^ 
DATED this *jw d^ay of (j(/£_ 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
EXHIBIT C 
Robert J. Dale, No. 0808 
Lynn c. McMurray, No. 2213 
Attorneys for Fidelity National 
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Co-counsel for Plaintiff 
Canada Life Assurance Company 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY 
Plaintiff, 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership, et. al., 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual 
et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Consolidated Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The Motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Company ("Fidelity") for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert 
and Joan DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") came on for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 28, 1990, at of 1:00 
-1-
Fill PMPV 
p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding. 
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates. Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale 
and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having 
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to 
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully 
and duly informed in the premises, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FIKDIKGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased 
from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was 
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed 
is referred to herein as the "Property") ., 
2. While the Building was still under construction, 
DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale. 
3. DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title & Abstract 
Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the 
"Closing"). At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of 
closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents"). 
4. One of the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and 
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Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated 
December 13, 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A 
and made a patt hereof) . Line 48 of the Closing Statement provided 
for payment cjf $79,247.16 to be made to Cascade at the Closing. 
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an 
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked on 
the Building (the "Subcontractors"). The Closing Statement 
specifically stated: 
The undersigned Buyer [DeBrys] and Seller 
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing 
statement and authorize Utah Title & Abstract 
Company, to complete the transaction in 
accordance herewith. All instruments may 
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed, 
[emphasis added]. 
5. Pursuant to DeBrys' and Cascade's Closing Statement, 
Utah Title disbursed the $143,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but 
only $57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $21,923.$2 was 
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property 
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization. These amounts 
were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-Woodbury"). 
€• As a further part of the Closing, DeBrys also 
executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust deed on the 
Property in the amount of $62,500.00, representing the balance of 
the purchase price for the Building and Property to be paid by 
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DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The 
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written 
Closing Statement at line 7. 
7. DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and 
Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded. 
8. In connection with the Closing, DeBry, Cascade, and 
Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger 
Agreement" (DeBrys1 Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted by 
counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part 
hereof) . Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work 
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and 
although "various issues concerning the construction remain 
unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement 
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily 
supplied by Seller." 
9. DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys1 Escrow 
Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed wo\ild be escrowed with Utah 
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the 
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for 
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues. DeBrys' Escrow 
Agreement specifically provided 
that the amount of increase in allowances, 
the decrease in the charge of any extras, the 
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increase in any credits, and the amount paid 
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is 
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic.1 
to perform which the parties agree to or which 
a court or other authority orders Buyers are 
entitled to, shall be deducted from the 
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note 
rthe Note! and Trust Deed. Until the disputes 
which exists fsic.] concerning allowances, 
extras, credits and unfinished work are 
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise, 
Buyers may also deduct all funds owed it 
Fsic.] under the warranty described in 
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for work-
manship and materials] and Seller's obli-
gation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's 
indemnification against mechanic's liens] 
from the amounts owed under the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added]. 
10. By letter dated December 16, 1985 (three days 
after the date of the signed Closing Statement), 'Mr. Jeffrey K. 
Woodbury ("Woodbury"), attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written 
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury 
(the "Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof). Richards-
Woodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property 
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds on the 
title" of the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a 
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was 
expressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions 
to use Richards-Woodbury's loan proceeds to clear those 
encumbrances and "clouds on title." 
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11. The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further 
stated: 
After you have determined that all the liens 
and clouds on the property [the Property] 
have been satisfied and removed and that the 
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above 
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing 
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be 
a first lien, you may disburse the remaining 
funds from the check described in paragraph 
8. above [the $485,973.35 check representing 
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodbury's 
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises 
[emphasis added]. 
In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury 
did not intend by the words "clouds on the property" to refer to 
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license or building 
permit to construct the Building. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having or not 
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically 
did not refer to any lack of a contractor's license or building 
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title. 
12. DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and others 
for the alleged faulty construction of the Building. DeBrys named 
Utah Title as one of many defendants and asserted the following 
claims against Utah Title: 
a. That Cascade did not have a contractor's 
license or building permit to construct the Building. DeBrys 
claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the 
Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, 
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that 
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized 
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should not have disbursed to 
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and 
building permit. 
b. That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse 
any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
c. That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for 
allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not 
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
13. Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended 
their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant. In their 
Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this 
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter of 
Utah Title for the purpose of issuing title policies, and that 
pursuant to §31A-23-308, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), Fidelity is 
liable for Utah Title's alleged misconduct. §31A-23-308 states, in 
relevant part: 
Any title company represented by one or more 
title insurance agents, is directly and 
primarily liable to others dealing with the 
title insurance agents for the receipt and 
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disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
closings, or settlements with the title 
insurance agents in all those transactions 
where a commitment or binder for or policy 
or contract of title insurance of that title 
insurance company has been ordered, or a 
preliminary report of the title insurance 
company has been issued or distributed. 
14. After Fidelity was brought into this action as a 
party Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 
proceeding is still pending. 
15. Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. The DeBrys were 
also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some 
of the Closing Documents, including DeBry's Escrow Agreement. 
16. Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing undisputed material facts, the 
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. Any lack of a contractor's license or building 
permit by Cascade did not create a cloud on the title to the 
Property. 
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2. Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah 
Title to determine whether Cascade had a contractor's license or a 
building permit. 
3. There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents, 
including without limitation in the Closing Statement or DeBrys' 
Escrow Agreement. If there were any ambiguities in DeBrys* Escrow 
Agreement, they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the 
document. 
4. The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with 
respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified, 
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents 
themselves without the need for any parol evidence. 
5. The Closing Documents authorized immediate 
disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the 
Closing Statement) and the balance owing to Seller (line 48 of the 
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys. The oral 
agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written 
Closing .Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the 
introduction of any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements. 
6. The December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury Escrow 
Instructions were intended to protect someone other than DeBrys. 
DeBrys are not third-party beneficiaries of the December 16, 1985 
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to 
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assert any alleged violation of those instructions. 
7. There was no violation of the Closing Documents by 
Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah 
Title in connection with the Closing. 
8. Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under §31A-23-308, 
Utah Code Annotated. Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to 
DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement 
regarding the Property. 
9. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law, 
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeBrys should be 
granted. 
10. As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is 
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor. 
Dated this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Robert J. DeBRY and Joan DeBry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
FTOELTTY NATIONAL TITLE . 
INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 910329-CA 
FILED: March 18,1992 . . . 
Third District, Salt Lake County . - • 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
ATTORNEYS: 
Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellants 
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and 
Russon. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
GARFF, Judge: 
- • ^ - i • * * 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs, Robert 
J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (DeBrys), against 
defendant Fidelity National -Title Insurance 
Company (Fidelity). The summary judgment 
was certified by the trial court for appeal 
pursuant.to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The underlying action,'which inv-
olves multiple parties and multiple causes of 
action,1 stems from DeBrys' purchase of an 
office building. As a threshold matter, Fidelity 
claims that notice of appeal was not timely 
filed/ and therefore,' this • appeal should be 
dismissed. Because timely notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional, Armstrong Rubber Co. v. 
Bastian, 657 P.2d ,1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); 
Nelson v." Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 
1983), we must first determine whether 
DeBrys' notice of appeal was timely. -n ., 
On March 28, 1990, after DeBrys and Fid-
elity presented oral argument, the trial court 
granted Fidelity's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court directed Fidelity to prepare 
and submit to the court proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in 
conformity with the court's ruling. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). 
On April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered 
to DeBrys' counsel a copy of the proposed 
findings of facr, conclusions of law, and jud-
gment. All other counsel were served by mail 
on April 25, 1990. After allowing the five-
day objections period to run, as specified in 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration,2 Fidelity submitted the prop-
osed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment to the trial court on May 2, 1990. 
That same day, the trial court signed and the 
clerk of the court entered the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment. 
On May 7, 1990, five days after entry of 
judgment, DeBrys filed a document entitled 
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law." In the document, DeBrys objected to 
various findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and argued that specific additional findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should be made by 
the trial court. On May 22, 1990, DeBrys filed 
a notice of appeal "from the order ... granting 
summary judgment ... entered ... on May 2, 
1990." . • • • • ' • 
On November 16, 1990, Fidelity mailed to 
DeBrys' counsel a copy of a proposed order 
denying DeBrys' objections and additions to 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. The proposed order characterized 
DeBrys' objections and additions as a motion 
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.3 DeBrys did not object to the 
proposed order. Thereafter, on December 11, 
1990, the trial court signed the order expressly 
construing DeBrys' objections and additions 
as a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule 
52(b). The court's order, a copy of which had 
been previously mailed to DeBrys' counsel on 
November 16, 1990, stated, "IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs''motion pursuant 
to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law be and is hereby denied." 
DeBrys did not file a notice of appeal after the 
court's December 11,"' 1990, order, nor did 
they object to the order until some ten months 
later on October 21, 1991, when they filed a 
motion to amend pursuant to Rule 60, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. After oral argument, 
the trial court denied the motion to amend.4 '-' * 
DeBrys argue that their document concer-
ning objections and additions to proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law was 
not a Rule 52(b) motion and that the trial 
court erred in construing it as such.5 In dete-
rmining whether the court properly characte-
rized DeBrys' document, we look to the doc-
ument's substance rather than its caption. See 
Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1347-48 (citing Howard 
v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152,~356 
P.2d 275, 276 (I960)); Callardo v. Bolinder, 
800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam). 
The court's conclusion that DeBrys'' docu-
ment constituted a Rule 52(b) motion- is legal 
in nature; thus, it is accorded no particular 
deference ' and reviewed for correctness. 
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson,- 782 P.2d 
467, 470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v. 
Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532~(Utah 
1988); but see Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 521 
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(reviewing for "abuse of- discretion" trial 
court's construction of motion to vacate as 
motion to amend under Rule 59(e)). 
DeBrys insist that their document concer-
ning objections and additions to findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should not have 
been construed as a Rule 52(b) motion because 
it did not constitute a "motion" per se.« They 
reason that because their document was an 
objection and not a post-judgment motion, 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) does 
not apply, and that their notice of appeal was 
valid and that hence this court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal.7 
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion 
filed within ten days of the entry of judgment 
that questions the correctness of the court's 
findings and conclusions is properly treated as 
a post-judgment motion under either Rules 
52(b) or 59(e).» Armstrong. 657 P.2d at 1347-
48; Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817; Vreeken v. 
Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1983). The 
substance of a motion, not its caption, is 
controlling.' See Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1348; 
Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817. In the instant case, 
DeBrys' motion in substance requested the 
trial court to amend and make additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a 
request .recognized by Rule 52(b). Further-
more, DeBrys' motion was timely inasmuch as 
it was filed five days after entry of judgment." 
- Based on the circumstances and the subst-
ance of DeBrys' motion, the trial court did 
not err in disposing of it as a post-judgment 
motion pursuant to Rule 52(b).» 
Moreover, because the trial court, under 
Rules 50(b), 52(b). or 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, can still alter or amend the judg-
ment, amend its findings, or make additional 
findings, a notice of appeal is of no effect if 
filed prior to the disposition of a post-
judgment motion under any of these rules. "A 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
to confer jurisdiction upon this court." Tran-
samcrica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 
P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); accord 
Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); U-M Invs. v. Ray, 
658 P.2d 1186, .1186-87 (Utah 1982) (per 
curiam). Once a timely post-judgment 
motion is made pursuant to one of these rules, 
to permit an appeal would be an affront to 
judicial' economy inasmuch as the very 
purpose of such a motion is to allow a trial 
court to correct its own errors, thus avoiding 
needless appeals. Cf. U-M Invs., 658 P.2d at 
1187 (recognizing that the requirement of 
filing a notice of appeal after disposition of a 
post-judgment motion "may assist in disco-
uraging delay in the judicial process*); 9 
James W. Moore « a/., Moore's Federal 
Practice 204.12[1], at 4-68, 4-69 & n.5 (2d 
ed. 1991) (stating that "[t]he very purpose of 
such [post-judgment] motions is to permit 
the trial court to correct its own errors, and 
thus avoid needless appeals"). 
In the instant case, summary judgment was 
entered on May 2, 1990. DeBrys filed their 
Rule 52(b) motion on May 7, 1990, and their 
notice of appeal on May 22, 1990. The trial 
court denied DeBrys' Rule 52(b) motion on 
December 11, 1990. No further appeal was 
filed. As previously noted, Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(b) requires the filing of 
a new notice of appeal within the prescribed 
time after entry of the trial court's order dis-
posing of a Rule 52(b) post-judgment 
motion. Because DeBrys failed to file a notice 
of appeal after the court denied their post-
judgment motion, we are without jurisdiction 
and the appeal is dismissed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge • 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Appeals involving other parties in this action are 
now before this court. 
2. Rule 4-504(2) provides that *[c]opies of the 
proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be 
served upon opposing counsel before being prese-
nted to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be sub-
mined to the court and' counsel within five days 
after service.* . . . . 
3. Rule 52(b) provides in relevant part that '[ujpon 
motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings 
or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly.' 
4. The trial court's denial of the motion to amend is 
the subject of a separate notice of appeal filed on 
January 28,1992. 
5. In addition, DeBrys contend that the court erred 
by prematurely signing the findings of fact, concl-
usions of law, and judgment before the time for 
objections had run pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. DeBrys' 
counsel was served with a copy of the proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment 
on April 24, 1990, and all other counsel were served 
by mail on April 25, 1990. This service by mail, they 
claim, addedi three days to their five-day objections 
period of Rule 4-504(2), and therefore, all counsel 
had until May 7, 1990, to file their objections. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e). 
DeBrys* argument is without merit. They were 
served with a copy of the proposed findings of fan, 
conclusions of law, and judgment on April 24, 1990. 
Pursuant to the five-day objections period of Rule 
4-504(2), excluding the intermediate Saturday and 
Sunday as required by Rule 6(a), DeBrys' objections 
were due May 1, 1990. On May 2, 1990, the trial 
court signed and the clerk of the court entered the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. 
Although the five-day objections period for 
other counsel bad not yet run, inasmuch »s they 
were served by mail on April 25, 1990, the court's 
apparent oversight is inconsequential for two 
reasons. First, no other names had an interest in 
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nor did they oppose Fidelity's motion for summary 
judgment. Second, no objections were filed by other 
counsel, nor have other counsel complained that 
they should have been allowed to file objections. 
6. A motion is an application made to the court for 
the purpose of obtaining a ruling or order directing 
some act to be done in favor of the applicant. Elliot 
v. Elliot, 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (T«. Ct. App. 1990). 
7. Rule 4(b) provides in relevant part: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial 
court by any party ... under Rule 52(b) 
to amend or make additional findings of 
fact, whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the 
motion is granted the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry ~ 
.. _.of the order denying ... such motion. A 
notice of appeal filed before the dispo-
sition of any of the above motions shall 
have no effect. A new notice of appeal 
must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of 
the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above. 
8. Rule 59(e) provides that *[a] motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 
10 days after entry of the judgment. * .. 
9. This is consistent with the requirement that the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally const-
rued. Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). 
10. Additional reasons support the trial court's 
construction of DeBrys' motion as a Rule 52(b) post-
judgment motion. After filing their motion, DeBrys 
made no attempt to withdraw the motion, nor did 
they attempt to communicate to the trial court that 
it was not a post-judgment motion. Despite their 
knowledge that judgment had been entered five days 
prior to the filing of their motion, DeBrys proce-
eded to file a notice of appeal. Moreover, by recei-
ving a copy of the proposed order almost a month 
before the trial conn's order disposing of their 
motion, DeBrys were on notice that the court would 
construe their motion as a Rule 52(b) post-
judgment motion. 
11. The instant case is readily distinguishable from 
/Veerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1991), where the Utah Supreme Court held that 
motions for entry of findings, pursuant to Rule 
52(a) or (b), filed after a trial court's granting of 
summary judgment without findings of fact, does 
not toll the time for appeal. Id. at 321-23. In 
contrast, the trial court in the case at bar sua sponte 
requested and signed findings of faa and conclus-
ions of law after granting Fidelity's motion for 
summary judgment. Moreover, DeBrys' post-
judgment motion, in contrast with that filed in /Veer-
ings, did not request - an - entry of findings; 
rather it requested the trial court to amend and 
make additional findings of faa and conclusions of 
law. 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Myrne M. COLLIER, as personal 
representative of the Estate of James A. 
Collier, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
• • 
Kerry M. HEINZ and Southwest Virginia 
Shopping Center Associates, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
. Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 900138-CA 
FILED: March 19, 1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
ATTORNEYS: 
James R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Randy S. Feil, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Onne. 
This opinion is subject to revision before -
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Heinz appeals the trial court's 
judgment interpreting a settlement agreement 
in favor of plaintiff, the personal representa-
tive of the Estate of James A. Collier. Heinz 
also appeals the trial court's award of atto-
rney, fees to the. estate. .We affirm the trial 
court's interpretation of the'settlement agre-
ement and reverse the award of attorney fees. 
' FACTS 
Defendant Heinz and James Collier were 
business partners in a number of general and 
limited partnerships. Upon Collier's death, 
Heinz and some of these partnerships brought 
claims against Collier's estate relating to the 
partnership agreements. Similarly, the estate 
filed claims against Heinz and many of the 
partnerships/' --'•'-"•- -*' 
On February 12, 1988, after months of 
negotiations, the estate-and Heinz, both rep* 
resented by counsel, entered into a settlement 
agreement. In this agreement, Heinz gave up 
certain rights and claims against the estate in 
consideration for the estate's release of some 
of its rights and claims against Heinz. Subse-
quent to this agreement, a dispute arose over 
the rights of Heinz and the estate concerning 
the distribution of assets from one of their 
dissolved partnerships. Under the settlement 
agreement,' the estate maintained a fifty 
percent general partnership interest in that 
partnership. The trial court held that the Ian-
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TeleDhone: (301) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs.
 t 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. 1 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER 
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) 
Civil No. C86-553 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, plaintiff moves the court for an order amending 
the court's order denying Plaintiff's Objections to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which order was signed 
December 11, 1990. 
Plaintiff seeks amendment of the order to delete 
references to a Rule 52(b) motion because no such motion was ever 
filed. The order should reflect only that objections to the 
"proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law" were denied and 
that the court entered the proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as submitted by counsel for defendant Fidelity. 
Plaintiff requests oral argument pursuant to Rule 4-
501(3)(b) and 4-501(4). 
DATED this /~\/ day of September, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER CORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
 r (DeBry V. Cascade, 
et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the jj r^day of September, 
1991, to the following: 
Lynn McMurray 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
455 East 500 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SP3-880/jn 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants.
 t 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER 
Civil No. C86-553 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1)(a), plaintiffs file this 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Order. 
BACKGROUND 
On March 28, 1990 the court heard and granted the motion 
of Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (hereinafter 
"Fidelity") for summary judgment. Following this hearing, counsel 
for Fidelity submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to the court along with a proposed judgment. 
Prior to becoming aware that the court had signed and 
entered the proposed findings and conclusions plaintiffs' counsel 
filed plaintiffs' objections and additions to proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration. See, Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, 
attached as Exhibit A. 
Upon receiving notice the court had signed the findings 
and judgment, plaintiffs' counsel assumed the objections were 
overruled by the court and notice of appeal was then timely filed. 
Counsel for Fidelity never filed a response to plaintiffs' 
objections. 
On November 16, 1990, counsel for Fidelity filed a 
document entitled order denying plaintiffs' objections and motion 
to amend proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. This 
document was signed by the court December 11, 1990. The said order 
provides: 
Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 52(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law be and hereby is denied. 
Defendant Fidelity now seeks dismissal of plaintiffs' 
appeal at the court of appeals on the ground the notice of appeal 
was not filed after denial of a Rule 52 (b) motion to amend the 
judgment. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to vacate or 
amend the order to delete references to a Rule 52(b) motion because 
no such motion was ever filed. 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR MOTION 
This matter is presently before the Utah Court of Appeals 
on the appeal by plaintiff of this court's order granting summary 
judgment to Fidelity. 
In Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App. 
1988) . The Utah Court of Appeals held that a Rule 60 motion may be 
considered by the trial court while the appeal is pending. 
ARGUMENT 
This court should amend the order entered December 11, 
1990 to remove the language relating to Rule 52(b) for the 
following reasons: 
1. Plaintiff did not File a Rule 52(b) Motion. 
The order purports to deny a Rule 52(b) motion allegedly 
filed by plaintiffs. No such motion was ever filed. The pleading 
filed clearly states it is "objections and additions to proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law" (emphasis added) . Rule 4-
504 clearly allows such a filing. The pleading is not labeled as 
a motion. Rule 52(b) is nowhere mentioned. At the time of filing, 
3 
counsel for plaintiff was not aware judgment had been signed and 
was attempting to object under Rule 4-504. See, Exhibit A. 
Thus, it is clear there was no Rule 52(b) motion. 
2. If Plaintiff's objections are in fact construed bv the 
court to be a Rule 52fb) motion, then the order 
complained of was entered in violation of procedural 
rules. 
If, notwithstanding the argument in Section 1, above, the 
court construes plaintiff's objections to be a Rule 52(b) motion, 
then the order of December 11, 1990 was entered in violation of the 
procedural mandate of Rule 4-501(1) of the Civil Rules of Practice. 
If, for the sake of argument, we assume the objections were in fact 
a Rule 52(b) motion, then before the motion could be lawfully 
submitted to the court for signing, the provisions of Rule 4-501(1) 
would need to be followed. Rule 4-501(1) (d) is explicit and 
mandatory. Before a motion can be submitted to the court for 
decision a separate written pleading captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision" with a certificate showing mailing to all parties 
must be filed. The rule is explicit "if neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision." 
There was never a notice to submit for decision filed by 
defendant Fidelity. In fact, under Rule 4-501(b), Fidelity's 
failure to file a response to the alleged Rule 52(b) motion 
precludes them from submitting the matter for decision. If a 
memorandum in opposition is not filed, rule 4-501(1)(b) provides 
4 
for submission for decision under Rule 4-501(1) (d) only bv the 
moving party. 
Since the procedure necessary to file and submit a motion 
for decision was clearly not followed and in fact Rule 4-501(d) was 
violated by Fidelity in submitting the order for signature, the 
court should either: 
a) vacate the order and sign an amended order deleting 
references to Rule 52(b) and clearly stating that 
objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or 
b) vacate the December 11, 1990 Order and require Rule 
4-501 to be followed prior to entry of a new order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the court should grant 
the motion of plaintiff and either: 
a) vacate the order and enter a new order deleting 
references to Rule 52(b) and clearly stating 
objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or 
b) vacate the order and require compliance with Rule 
4-501(1). 
DATED this A^/""^"day of September, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
"~ "EDWARD T. WELLS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND ORDER. fDeBry v. Cascade, 
et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the 2-7-^av of September, 
1991, to the following: 
Lynn McMurray 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
455 East 500 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 34111 
SP3-881/jn 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. , 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., • ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
i AFFIDAVIT 
i WELLS 
Civil No. 
JUDGE PAT 
OF EDWARD T. 
C86-553 
B. BRIAN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Edward T. Wells, being duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel for plaintiff in reference to matters 
related to defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance (hereinafter 
"Fidelity"). 
2. On or before May 4, 1990, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Practice, I prepared Objections to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which had been proposed by 
counsel for Fidelity as part of an order granting summary judgment. 
3. I signed the objections on May 4, 1991. 
4. At the time the objections were prepared and signed, 
I was not aware the judgment had been signed. 
5. There was no mention of Rule 52(b) in the objections 
filed and I had no intent to involve Rule 52(b) because I was not 
aware a judgment had been entered. 
6. No Rule 52(b) motion has ever, been filed by 
plaintiff regarding the Fidelity judgment. 
7. I have never received a pleading from Fidelity's 
counsel which purported to respond to my objections or to be a 
memorandum in opposition to a Rule 52(b) motion. 
8. I have never received from counsel for Fidelity a 
notice to submit a Rule 52(b) motion for decision. 
9. I have never received from anyone a notice to submit 
for decision under Rule 4-501(1)(d) with respect to the objections 
to proposed findings signed by me on May 4, 1990. 
10. I have never filed a notice to submit such 
objections for decision. 
2 
DATED this 27^^day of September, 1991. 
By: y^>l //l'i. 
^ EDWARD T. WELLS 
/ ) I SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO b e f o r e me t h i s -J I day of 
V I)IjTUn^lsJjj 1991, 
res: 
V
^ ? F U ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ / 
RESIDING IN: 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDA.VIT OF EDWARD T. WELLS. (DeBzy v. Cascade, et al.l was 
mailed, postage prepaid, on the ,£__£__ day of September, 1991, to 
the following: 
Lynn McMurray 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
455 East 500 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
c/-4«/ 
SP3-882/jn 
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. ] 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs.
 t 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. ' 
i REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
> AMEND ORDER 
) CASE NO. C83-553 
JUDGE PAT BRIAN 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Fidelity has not disputed any of the facts set out 
in the memorandum of plaintiff in support, of the motion to amend 
the order centered herein December 11, 1990. Therefore, they are 
accepted as true. Defendants have not contested the statements 
contained in the affidavit filed in support of the motion. 
ULC 
Tiiir 
BY 
-" 
4 is 
~'-
j 
FH 91 
;;.TP.!CT 
..HTY 
' CLLRK 
Plaintiff disputes the characterization of "facts" contained 
in paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows: 
a) The objections to proposed findings were mooted when the 
court entered the judgment. No formal order was needed. 
b) Defendant's characterization of a "loose end" remaining 
is spurious. No motion was pending. The court had not 
been asked to do anything to the judgment entered on May 
2, 1990. The letters referred to (Exhibit C & D) were 
not delivered to counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for defendants have cited to the court no legal 
authority and have filed no affidavits to support their position. 
The entire basis for the language which is objected to in the 
December 11, 1990 order is defense counsel's "characterization" of 
plaintiff's objections to the proposed findings as a Rule 52(b) 
motion. 
A motion is defined in law as an application to a court for an 
order. E.g. . Wolff v. Wolff, 25 Or. App. 739, 550 P. 2d 1388 
(1976); Iverson v. Second Judicial District Court. 66 Nev. 145, 206 
P.2d 755 (1949); Williams v. Denning. 260 N.C. 539, 133 S.E.2d 150, 
151 (1963); Schoenberg v. Benner. 59 Cal. Rptr. 359, 367 (Cal. App. 
1967); Behm v. Division of Administration. 275 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla. 
2 
App. 1973); State v. James. 347 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Mo. 1961); Elliot 
v. Elliot. 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App. 1990); People v. Thomas. 
34 111. App.3d 1002, 341 N.E.2d 178, 182 (1976); see, Black's Law 
Dictionary at 1164 (4th ed. 1951). 
Counsel cannot convert objections to proposed findings into a 
Rule 52(b) motion merely because part of the "objections" was a 
suggestion additional findings were needed. Rule 52(b) is nowhere 
mentioned in the pleading filed by plaintiff. Plaintiff asked for 
no relief at all, let alone Rule 52(b) relief. No order or other 
type of relief is sought. There is no suggestion any order be 
amended. The pleading is simply and by definition not a motion. 
Id. Contrary to the argument of defendant the pleading 
"substantially" cannot be a motion because it seeks no relief and 
asks for no order. Jd. Thus, the language in the December 11 
order is not only baseless, but it mischaracterizes the pleading as 
a matter of law. On its face the pleading is an objection to 
proposed findings. Defendants cite not one case to support their 
position. The cases cited herein by plaintiff defining a "motion" 
are representative of the general rule. 
Since no Rule 52(b) motion was filed, the questioned language 
should be stricken because a court cannot deny a non-existent 
motion. 
3 
POINT II 
THE MANNER OF ENTERING THE ORDER WAS 
PROCEDURALLY IRREGULAR 
Notwithstanding defendants' argument to the contrary, the 
entry of the December 11, 1990 order was procedurally irregular and 
improper. 
Simply stated, the procedure under Rule 4-501 is as follows: 
1. A motion is filed and a supporting memorandum must 
accompany the motion unless uncontested or ex parte [(Rule 4-
501(a)] (the fact no memorandum accompanied plaintiff's objections 
argues no motion was intended). 
2. The responding party may file a responsive memorandum 
within ten days. If no memo is filed, the moving party may submit 
for decision. By failing to file a response, the right to submit 
for decision is waived. [Rule 4-501(b)]. 
3. If a responsive memorandum is filed the moving party may 
file a reply within five days. (Rule 4-501(c)]. 
4. If a responsive memo was filed, then five days later, 
whether or not a reply is filed, either party may then file a 
notice to submit for decision [Rule 4-501(d)]. 
The reasons why the December 11, 1990 order was irregular and 
improperly entered are as follows: 
1. A motion was not filed by definition. Elliot v. Elliot. 
supra. 
4 
2. Defendants did not respond pursuant to Rule 4-501(b). 
Thus, Rule 4-$oi(c) and (d) do not come into play. 
3. Ever^  assuming, arguendo, defendant could properly submit 
the supposed lnotion for decision, defendant failed to follow the 
requirements $f Rule 4-501(d) by filing a notice to submit for 
decision. 
Thus, Rule 4-501 was not properly complied with in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised herein were not before the court when 
the order was signed. The court has signed an order wherein 
defense counsel mischaracterized the matter pending before the 
court. As a matter of law, there was no Rule 52(b) motion and 
therefore, the court must strike from its December 11, 1990 order 
all references to a supposed ruling on a non-existent Rule 52 (b) 
motion. 
DATED this <c " day of /j^C^yvvU^, 1991. 
HDBERT J. DEBXY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By: /.^^7..-\A<-^ •^r'/ L''l^&~> 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND ORDER. (DeBry 
v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the /p£— day 
of December, 1991, to the following: 
Lynn McMurray 
McMURRAY, MCMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
455 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SP3-889/jn 
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EXHIBIT F 
L'i:-w , 
Lynn C. McMurray, #2213 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
ROBERT J. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership, et. a_l., 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual 
et. al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO 
AMEND PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C36-553 
Judge Pat 3. 3rian 
On Wednesday, March 23, 1990, the Court heard and granted 
the motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company 
for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Robert and Joan DeBry 
Thereafter, on May 2, 1990, the Court entered its Findings of 
FIDE-0E3.0R0/LCX/en 
Undisputed Material Facts and Conclusions of Law on Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment) 
and its Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Fidelity National 
Title Insurance Company Against Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and 
Joan DeBry. Thereafter, on May 4, 1990, Plaintiff submitted 
Plaintiff's Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. No party having requested oral argument, 
and the Court being fully and duly informed in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion pursuant to 
Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ,pf*Law be and is hereby denied. 
DATED this // day of^ November, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
PatB. Brian, 
District: Judge 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order 
Denying Plaintiff's Objections and Motion to Amend Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid this day of November, 1990, to: 
fIDE-0E3.ORO/LCM/em - 2 -
Thomas Grisley 
Roy G. Haslam 
PARSONS, 3EHLE & LATIMER 
#185 So. Stare Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 34111 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del Bartel 
P. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Del Bartel 
P. 0. Box 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merrimac Court 
Vallejo, California 94859 
Stanley Postma 
2571 South 75 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Richard Carling 
SHEARER & CARLING 
2650 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Glen Roberts 
WOODBURY, 3ETTILYON & KESLER 
2 677 Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
FI0E-0EB.CRO/LCM/em 
Curtis J. Drake 
Michael A. Peterson 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
P. 0. 3ox 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4110 
Paul Maughan 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34116 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COKNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
P. 0. 3ox 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34147 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 300 South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101 
Randall L. SJceen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34106 
Craig Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
425 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Van Ellsworth 
1414 Laburnum Street 
McLean, Virginia 22101 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Darwin C. Hansen 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
136 South Main, 3th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101 
Vl r?\ .... /JU 3?• (/,,,^. 
EXHIBIT G 
•"•'Lin 
3 r. - , 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
i NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CASE NO. C8tf-553 
JUDGE PAT BRIAN 
TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
Plaintiffs herein appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from 
the order of the District Court entered herein on January 2, 1992 
denying plaintiffs' motion under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to amend an order entered December 11, 1990. 
DATED this day of January, 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EDWARD T . ' WETVLS 
• ' - M I . . , -.-.'STRICT 
Br '~- ;*>Tr 
•LERK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was nailed, postage 
prepaid, on the s~~J day of January, 1992, to the following: 
Lynn McMurray 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
4 55 East 500 South, #3 00 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SP3-890/jn 
EXHIBIT H 
FILE_ 
QUN171992 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Robert J. DeBry, and Joan 
DeBry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Fidelity National Title 
insurance Co., et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
tyT. Noona, 
Wi the Cour. 
MSSktoO of Appea.. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 920269-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u n e 1 7 , 1992) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellees 
Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Billings (Law and Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Both parties have filed memoranda in 
response to the motion. We summarily affirm on the basis that 
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review. 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (Fidelity). On 
April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to appellants7 counsel. 
The findings were mailed to all other counsel on April 25, 1990. 
On May 2, 1990, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment to the trial court, and the court 
signed the findings, conclusions, and judgment. 
Five days after the judgment was entered, appellants filed 
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law." The document objected to the 
findings and conclusions and asserted that specific additional 
findings and conclusions should be mac . r- May 22, 1990, 
appellants filed a notice of appeal fr_.a tr.= trial court's May 2 
order granting summary judgment. On December 11, 19. D, the trial 
court characterized appellants' objections as a Rule 52(b) motion 
and denied the motion. Appellants did not file a notice of 
appeal from the December 11, 1990 order. As a result, this court 
dismissed appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the 
basis that appellants failed to file a new notice of appeal after 
the court denied appellants Rule 52(b) motion. DeBrv v. Fidelity 
National Title Ins. Co.. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. March 
18, 1992). On December 21, 1991, appellants filed a motion to 
amend the December 11, 1990 order. The court denied the motion, 
and appellants filed this appeal. 
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated seven 
procedural rules in obtaining the December 11, 1990 order. 
However, on November 16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel 
a copy of the proposed order denying appellants' objections and 
additions to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Appellants did not object to the proposed order and did not raise 
any of the alleged procedural irregularities. In addition, 
appellants' motion to amend the December 11 order did not mention 
any of the asserted irregularities but merely sought to delete 
references to Rule 52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants 
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity committed 
procedural violations in obtaining the December 11 order. 
We summarily affirm on the basis that the appeal presents no 
substantial issue for review. Utah R. App. P. 10(c). We decline 
to award attorney fees on appeal. 
920269-CA 2 
EXHIBIT I 
s * SLED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Fidelity National Title, et al., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
JUL 29 1992 
Mary T. Nocnan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
ORDER 
Case No. 920269-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition 
for rehearing, filed July 7, 1992. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for 
rehearing is granted. The court shall consider the matter 
without oral argument. 
Dated this 29th day of July, 1992. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary J J Noonan 
Clerk\cf the Court 
EXHIBIT J 
CERTIFICATE O? gAND-DSLIYEflY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this '2j£"^Y cf April, 199 0, 
Edvard T. Weils 
4 252 South 7 00 East 
Salt La>;e Citv, UT 84107 
cm 
'J 
:NC 
I hereby certify -hat a true and 
_-.* ul 
> w _ _ ££ w> *- C w •* • «. 
CIS AND CDKCLI 
COMPANY ' S MO 
se 
w: 
SUMXAF.Y JUDGMENT was ~ailed firs~ class caii ccstace rreoaid, 
tms g.Q cay c: Apr:.-, 19 5 0 ~c: 
Thcr.as Grz.s^ .ey 
?.cy G. Kasiar. 
.".--•iiw.>i
 f —^r.~z. a i_-. ..; 
=1E5 So. Sta~e Stree~, = 7 00 
Cascade Construction 
c/o Del 3artel 
?. 0. 3ox 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Cascade Enterprises 
c/o Dale Thrugood 
4455 South 700 East, ^ 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4107 
Del 3artel 
?. 0. 3CX 7234 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Dale Thurgood 
4455 South 700 East, =300 
Salt Lake City, Utan 84107 
Lee Allen 3artei 
110 Merrisac Court 
Vallejc, California S4E59 
Stanley Rostra 
2571 South 7 5 Vest 
Bountiful, Utah 84C10 
Ricnard Car lino 
5KZ:-S^?. « CABLING 
2 00 Soutn Main Street, =1000 
w C — *. _*£.«** C W _ •» * ^  w « - C * O S «
 M _ 
Glen Roberts 
Paul Maughan 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2001 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
J--ff Silvejtrini 
COENE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL 
?. 0. 3cx 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Robert Hughes 
50 West 3 00 South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall L. Skeen 
1245 East Brickyard Rd., =60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Craig Petersen 
LITTLE7EELD S PETERSON 
425 Soutn 5 00 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Van Ellsvcrth 
1414 Laburnur. Street 
McLean, Virginia 22101 
D. Micnaei Nielsen 
Session Place 
£05 Soutn Main Street 
Bountut—, ^tan 84C_3 
Darvin C. Hansen 
EXHIBIT K 
If- — 
'J '. 
' • • J 
Robert J. Dale, No. 0808 
Lynn C. McMurray, No.' 2213 
Attorneys for Fidelity National 
Title Insurance Company and 
Co-counsel for Plaintiff 
Canada Life Assurance Company 
455 East 500 South., Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5125 
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sic—7 
O :• t". ;*' 
«•» rt. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. DE3RY AND JOAN DESRY 
P l a i n t i f f , 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a g e n e r a l 
p a r t n e r s h i p , e t . a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
P l a i n - r i f f , 
v s . 
BERT J . DEERY, an i n d i v i d u a l RO  J . 
D e f e n d a n t s , 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA* 
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
C o n s o l i d a t e d C i v i l Nc. C 3 6 - = = J 
J u d o e P a - B. B r i a n 
The M o t i o n c f D e f e n d a n t F i d e l i t y N a t i o n a l T i t l e I n s u r a n c e 
Co-par .y ( " F i d e l i t y " ) f o r S u m a r y J u d g r e r . r a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s R o b e r t 
and J o a n DeSry ( c o l l e c t i v e l y , "DeSrys") c a n e en f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e 
t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d c o u r t on Wednesday, March 2 3 , 1950 , a t cf 1:00 
p.s. / th.e Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding. 
DeBrys vere represented by Edvard T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry « 
Associates. Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale 
and Lynn C. KcHurray cf KcMurray, Mcliurray, Dale and Parkinson. 
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having 
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to 
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully 
and duly informed in the premises, the Court now enters the 
following: 
rrypryGs o? UNDISPUTED HATERTSW r^ crs 
1. Plaintiffs Robert J. De3ry and Joan DeBry purchased 
from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was 
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed 
is referred to herein as the "Property"). 
2. While the Building was still under construction, 
DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale. 
2. DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title £ Abstract 
Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the 
"Closing"). At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number cf 
closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents"). 
4 . Cne cf the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and 
Cascade was a c losing statement (the "Closing S ta teaen t" ) , . dated 
Deceaber 13; 1985 (a copy of which i s a t tached here to as Exhibit k 
and aade a p a r t hereof) . Line 4 3 of t he Closing Sta teaent provided 
for payment of $79,247.15 t s h : aade to Cascade a t the Closing. 
Line 44 of t he Closing Stateaent provided for the payaent of an 
e s t i a a t e d aaour.t of $14 3,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked on 
t h e Bui ld ing (the "Subcontractors") . The Closing Stateaent 
s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d : 
The undersigned 3uyer [DeBrys] and Se l le r 
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing 
s t a t eaen t and authorize Utah T i t l e « Abstract 
Ccapany, to conpiete the t r a n s a c t i o n in • 
accordance herewith. All ins t ruaer . t s r.^v 
be delivered er recorded a.nd funds disbursed. 
[eaphasis added]. 
5. Pursuant to DeBrys' and Cascade's Closing Stateaent , 
Utah T i t l e disbursed the $143,092.25 t o the Subcontractors, buz 
only $57,3 23.3 4 to Cascade because the reaa in ing $r1,923.82 was 
wi thhe ld froa Cascade to pay off encuabrances on the Property 
pu r suan t t o Cascade's p r io r wr i t ten a u t h o r i z a t i o n . These aaouats 
were p a i d p r i a a r i l y fron loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys froa 
?.ichar"ds-Woodbury .Jiort gag a Corporation ("Pochards-Woodbury") . 
6. As a f u r t h e r ' p a r t of the Closing, DeBrys also 
executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by & t r u s t deed en the 
Proper ty in t he aaount of $62,500.00, r ep re sen t ing the balance cf 
the purchase p r i c e for the 3uilding and Proper ty to be paid by 
DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed") . The 
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written 
Closing Statement at line 7. 
7. DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and 
Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded. 
S. In connection with the Closing, De3ry, Cascade, and 
Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Ncr.-Herger 
Agreement" (De3rys' Escrow Agreement") , which was drafted by 
counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Docunen-s (a 
copy cf which is attached herero as Exhibit 3 and made a parz 
hereof) . Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work 
cf constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and 
although "various issues concerning the construction remain 
unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing s-ateaent 
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily 
suoolied bv Seller." 
5. DeBrys and Cascade furuher agreed in DeBrys' Escrow 
Agreemer.u uhat the Nore and Trusz Deed would be escrowed wi-h Utah 
Title as security zo DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion cf the 
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty cf wor>:mar:ship and materials for 
the Building; and (c) ether unresolved issues. DeBrys' Escrow 
Arreeaenu soecificailv creviced 
that the amour.- cf increase in allowances, 
tne decrease in m e cnaroe cf any e>:~ras, the 
-4-
increase- in any credits; .and the amount paid 
by 'Buyers [the DeBrys] for vcrfc which is 
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic] 
to perform which the parties agree to or which 
a Court cr other authority orders Buyers are 
entitled to, shall be detracted from The 
aaount owed Seller under The Prcrisserv Vote 
rthe Notei and Trust Deed. Until the disputes 
wiiich exists f sic. ] concerning allowances, 
extras, credits and unfinished work are 
resolved either by Agreement cr otherwise, 
3uvers raav also deduct all funds owed -it 
rsic. ] under the warranty described in 
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for work-
manship and materials] and Seller's obli-
gation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's 
indemnification against nechanic's liens] 
frcr. the anounts owed under the Promissory 
Note and'Trust Deed [emphasis added]. 
10. 3y letter dated December 16, 1SS5 (three days 
after the date of the signed Closing Statement) , Mr. Jeffrey X. 
Woodbury ("Woodbury") , attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written 
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury 
(the "?.ichares-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof) . Richards-
Wocdbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property 
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds en the 
title" cf the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment fcr a 
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was 
expressly authorised in the Richards-Wo cdbury Escrow Instructions 
to use Richares-Wocdbury' s loan proceeds to clear those 
encumbrances and "clouds en title." 
.* / 
II. The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further 
stated: 
After you have determined t h a t a i l the l i e n s 
and clouds on the -property [ the Property] 
have been s a t i s f i e d and renoved and that the 
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above 
[ t h e Trust D&ed on the Property secur ing 
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] w i l l be 
a f i r s t l i en , vou r.»v disburse the reTnair.ir.c 
funds fror: the check described in naraeraor. 
S. above [the $485,573.25 check represen t ing 
t h e t o t a l loan proceeds fron Si.chards-Woodbury' s 
loan t o Debrys] to Cascade Enter-crises 
[emphasis added]. 
In d r a f t i n g t h e Richards-Woodbury Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s , Woodbury 
did not i n t e n d by the words "clouds en the p roper ty" to refer to 
Cascade 's a l l e g e d l y not having a c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i cense or building 
?er r . i t t o c o n s t r u c t the 3ui iding. Koreoever, the Richards-Woodbury 
Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s said nothing about Cascade's having cr not 
having a c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i cense cr bui lding p e m i t , and spec i f i ca l ly 
did not r e f e r t o any lac): of a ccntr&c-or ' s l i c ense cr building 
perr . i t by Cascade as a "cloud" on the P rope r ty ' s t i t l e . 
12. DeErys f i l e d t h i s act ion aga ins t Cascade and ethers 
fcr t h e a l l e g e d f au l ty construct ion of the Bui ld ing . DeErys named 
Utah T i t l e as one of nany defendants and a s s e r t e d the following 
c l a i r s a g a i n s t Utah T i t l e : 
a. That Cascade did not have a con t r ac to r ' s 
Property pursuant to the Richards -Woodbury Escrow Instructions, 
that'they are beneficiaries.of those escrow instructions, and that 
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorised 
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should net have disbursed to 
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor' s license and 
building perait. 
b. That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse 
any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the 
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
c. That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for 
allegedly negligently nisrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not 
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the 
3uilding was completed and approved by DeBrys. 
13. Since the filing of this acrcion, DeBrys have anendea 
their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant. In their 
Fourth Aaended Complaint, which is the governing cosplaint in this 
action, De3rys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter cf 
Utah Title for the purpose cf issuing title policies, and that 
pursuant to S2L.-.-22-2 0S, Utah Code Annotated (UC-.) , Fidelity is 
liable for Utah Title's alleged nisconduct. §21A-22-303 states, ir 
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
c los ings , or settlements with the t i t l e 
insurance agents in a l l those t r ansac t ions 
where a commitment or binder for cr pol icy 
or contract cf t i t l e insurance of t h a t t i t l e 
insurance company has been ordered, or a 
prel iminary report of the t i t l e insurance 
ccaoanv has been issued cr d i s t r i b u t e d . 
14. After Fidel i ty vas brought in to t h i s action as a 
par ty Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Ti t le filed^ s Chapter 11 3arJ:ruptcy 
p e t i t i o n , which was l a t e r converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 
proceeding i s s t i l l pending. 
15. Robert DeBry was at a l l t i n e s re levan t an attorney 
l icensed t o p rac t i ce law in the Stats of Utah. The DeBrys were 
a lso represen ted by other counsel at the Closing who drafted soma 
cf the Closing Documents, including De3ry's Escrow Agreement. 
15. F i d e l i t y ' s Motion for Summ2.ry Judgment was f i led 
a f t e r t he discovery cu--off date in the above-ent i t l ed act ion. 
Based cr. the foregoing undisputed mater ia l f ac t s , the 
Court hereby en te rs the following conclusions cf law: 
1. Any leek cf a cont rac tor ' s l i c ense cr building 
permit by Cascade did net create a cloud en the t i t l e to the 
Prooer tv . 
2. Neither ' -the Deceaber" 16, 1985 Richards-woodbury 
Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s nor any of the Closing Docuaents required Utah 
T i t l e t o de tura ine whether Cascade had a - c o n t r a c t o r ' s l icense cr a 
b u i l d i n g p e r a i t . 
3 . There i s no arbigui ty in t he Closing Docuaents, 
i nc lud ing without l i a i t a t i o n i:- the Closing S ta teaen t cr DeBrys' 
Escrow Agreeaent. If the re were any a a b i g u i t i e s in DeBrys' Escrow 
Agreement, they would be construed agair.su DeErys, who prepared the 
docuaenu. 
4. The al leged aabiguity a s se r t ed by DeErys v i th 
respecu t o l i n e 44 of the Closing S ta t eaen t i s e a s i l y c l a r i f i ed , 
r e c o n c i l e d , and consurued by reference t o the Closing Docuaenus 
t h e a s e l v e s without the need for any p a r o l evidence. 
5. The Closing Docuaenus author ized i aaed ia te 
d isburseaenu of the aaounus due Subconuracucrs ( l i ne 44 cf the 
•Closing S ta teaen t ) and the balance owing uo S e l l e r ( l ine 43 of the 
Closing Staueaer.u) wiuhouu further approval by DeBrys. The c ra l 
agrseaenus a l leged by DeBrys are i n c o n s i s t e n t with the wri t ten 
Closing Docuaents, and the parol evidence r u l e prohib i t s the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n cf any evidence of such i n c o n s i s t e n t cral . agreements. 
6. The Deceaber IS, 19S5 Richards-Woodbury Escrcw 
I n s t r u c t i o n s were intended to p r c t ec t soaeone other than DeBrys. 
DeErys a re not t h i r d - p a r t y benef i c i a r i e s cf the Deceaber 15, 19£5 
P.ichards-Wccdbury Escrow Ins t ruc t iens and have no standing to 
assert any alleged violation of those instructions. 
7. There vas no violation of the Closing Documents by 
Utah Title, and there vas no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah 
Title in connection with the Closing. 
S. Fidelity is not liable to DeHrys under S2LA-22-30S, 
Utah Code Annotated. Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to 
DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement 
recardinc the Prcoertv. 
S. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a natter cf lav, 
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against De3rys should be 
granted. 
10. As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules cf Civil 
Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is 
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor. 
Dateo this J cay cf :'• ' -. , , , 1SS0. 
BY THE CDUr.T: 
/' 
.-zt s. srian 
District Court Judce 
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EXHIBIT L 
. EDWARD T V ^ W E L L S : -"• A34 22"=ZT~~ 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attomevs for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East . 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DE3RY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al. , 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs submit the following objections and 
additions to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
submitted by defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. 
GENERAL OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Findings of fact are unnecessary to support the 
granting of summary judgment. .Mountain States v. Atkin, Wright S 
• 3 ^ ^ " ^ 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS 
AND ADDITIONS TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil' No. C86-553 
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. All that is required in this case is 
that the court enter an order declaring its findings that because 
it holds as a matter of law there were no disputed facts on 
material issues, judgment was rendered for defendant. 
There is an extensive record in this case. As long as 
the argument and issues have been raised before this Court, the 
plaintiffs should be allowed, on appeal, to use any portion of 
the record which supports their position. 
SPECIFIC 05JSCTI0NS TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Without waiving the General Objection just mentioned, 
the plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the 
proposed bindings of Fact. By making these specific objections, 
the plaintiffs do not intend to resubmit or reargue their 
exposition to Fidelity's Motion. The plaintiffs do, however, 
want to identify these issues which they contend are not properly 
submitted as findings and/or are disputed in the record. 
1. Regarding•finding number 1, the plaintiffs object 
to the language "under construction" on the third line. The fact 
is the building was represented to be substantially completed and 
a temporary certificate of occupancy was produced at closing to 
T 
support~the; claim that with the exception of a' few minor items 
set forth on said certificate, the building was completed. 
Plaintiffs never intended and did not believe they were buying a 
building which was "under construction." 
2. With respect to finding number 2, the comments to 
number 1 above would apply. 
3. With respect to finding number 4, plaintiffs 
object to the characterization by defendant as to what the 
closing statement says. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the 
language must be read .together with the language requiring 
approval-of plaintiffs of any dispersals. The specific language 
quoted is subject to the approval requirement. 
4. Plaintiffs object to finding number 5 on the 
grounds the court made no findings at the hearing regarding the 
manner or method of disbursement. 
5. With respect to paragraph 8, plaintiffs object to 
the characterisation of the escrow agreements' meaning. The 
court made no findings thereon and the document speaks for 
itself. 
5. With respect to paragraph 10, plaintiffs object to 
the characterization of the letter which speaks for itself. 
Furthermore, the loan proceeds at that point belonged to DeSrys 
and such finding should be noted. 
7. There is a disputed fact issue a s to the alleced 
intent of the Woodbury escrow instructions which should be noted 
in the findings. 
8. With respect to paragraph 12(b), it was and is the 
position of plaintiffs that the agreement j^t to disperse was 
bcth oral and in writing and the writing is evidenced by the 
language of the closing statement. 
5. With irespect to paragraph 12(c), the language 
should show that plaintiffs' claims included the negligent 
disburse! of the escrowed monies. 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The propose^ Conclusions of Law contain unnecessary and 
inappropriate restatement of the facts upon which the Conclusions 
are based. Conclusions of law should simply set forth the 
position of the Cour^
 as to the law applicable to the facts of 
the case. 
1. Conclusions of law numbered 3 and 4 are mixed 
conclusions. The legal conclusion is "the content is not 
ambicuous . " 
2. A specific finding should be included holding that 
S 21A-23-308 does not apply to losses caused by negligence as 
this finding was specifically made by the Court. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attornevs for Plaintiffs 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
EXHIBIT M 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A34 22 
ROBERT J. DE3RY « ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Sait Lake City, UT 84 107 
Telephone: (801) 2S2-SS15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
IN AND "OR SALT LAK: 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRi 
• COUNTY, STATE Or UTAH 
ROBERT.J. 
FIDELITY ] 
1KSURA24CS 
DeDry, pi 
DEBRY and JOAN 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIONAL TITLE 
U w . , t: _ C._ . , 
Defendants. 
Notice is her 
.aintiffs here: 
DE 
eby 
.n 
BRY 
S. 
naj 
i 
.ver. 
nee, 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil Nc. CZS-5S3 
) JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
that ?„obert J. DeBry and Joan 
hereby appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah frcr^  the order of the District Cou—t 
granting su.vjr.ary judgment in favor of Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Co. , entered herein on Kav I, i?9 0 and certified bv tr — 
District Court as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b) cf the 
livjl Procedure on May 2, 1 = 50. 
DATED this hjjk cav of Kay, IS30. 
n c r* • 
Attoms *»*s ~ ~< — s' ^  •'-»-.•- ^  
0 
EXHIBIT N 
subjects addressed in the parol agreements. A finding of 
integration is, nonetheless, implicit in the trial court's 
Findings of Fact. 
5. Fidelity is not liable under 531A-23-308 for Utah 
Title's alleged negligent misrepresentation tort. 
That statute contains absolutely no language making an 
underwriter liable for the torts of its title insurance agents. 
DeBrys' common law agency argument against Fidelity in its brief 
was not pleaded or argued below, is not supported in the record, 
is being raised for the first time on appeal, and is the subject 
of a totally separate lawsuit filed by DeBrys. Moreover, 
negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on an alleged 
misrepresentation of a "future event," as opposed to a 
representation of an existing material fact. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
1. THIS APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Two days after the Court below entered Summary Judgment in 
favor of Fidelity, DeBrys filed a motion to amend and make 
additions to the findings of fact. Before the district court 
entered its order denying their motion, DeBrys filed their only 
notice of appeal ever filed. Under Rule 4 (bj , Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, DeBrys' notice of appeal has no effect: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court 
by any party . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to 
amend or make additional findings of fact, 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order denying a new 
trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion . . . A notice of appeal filed before 
the disposition of any [such motion] shall 
have no effect. A new notice of appeal must 
be filed within the prescribed time measured 
court disposing of the motion as provided 
above [emphasis added]. 
On December 11, 1990, the trial court denied DeBrys' motion 
in an order stating as follows in relevant part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion 
pursuant to Rule 52 (b) , Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law be and is hereby 
denied. (R. 12917; App. Z). 
The 30 day period for filing DeBrys' Notice of Appeal thus began 
to run on December 11, 1990, and DeBrys' prior May 22, 1990 
Notice of Appeal therefore was filed prematurely and was totally 
ineffective. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in Transamerica 
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen. 723 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986), that a 
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a post-judgment 
motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme 
Court. Also, in Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) , this Court held that a post-judgment motion like this 
suspends the finality of the judgment, and that a notice of 
appeal filed prior to the disposition of such a motion by entry 
of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an 
appellate court. Because DeBrys filed their notice of appeal 
before obtaining a ruling on their proposed additions to the 
findings of fact, their notice of appeal was ineffective to 
confer jurisdiction on this Court, and this appeal therefore 
should be dismissed. 
2. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW ONLY THOSE CLAIMS RAISED IN DEBRYS' 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IGNORE THOSE ISSUES NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE IT. 
EXHIBIT 0 
Robert J. Dale, #0808 
Lynn C. McMurray, #2213 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-5125 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, and JOAN DEBRY, \ 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants.
 t 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C86-553 
i Judge Pat B. Brian 
Robert and Joan DeBrys' Motion to Amend Order came on for 
hearing before the above entitled court on Friday December 20, 1991 
at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District 
Court Judge, presiding. DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells 
of Robert J. DeBry & Associates, their attorneys, and Fidelity 
National Title Insurance, Co. was represented by Lynn C. McMurray, 
of McMurray, McMurray, Dale & Parkinson, its attorneys. The Court 
having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having 
heard the argument of counsel, and being fully and duly informed in 
the premises and good cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Robert and Joan Debrys' September 
27, 1991 Motion to Amend Order be and is hereby denied. 
Dated this day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian, 
District Court Judge 
riD\DEBRY.ord.mh - 2 -
EXHIBIT P 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
* ^ / • " .Noonan 
^ . . .01 the Court 
Robert J. DeBry and Joan 
DeBry, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Cascade Enterprises, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
i-ah Court of Appeals 
NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE 
CONSIDERATION BY THE 
COURT FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Case No. 920269-CA 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of 
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This ""case is being 
considered for summary disposition pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
10(e) on the basis that the appeal presents no substantial issue 
for review. In lieu of a brief, both parties are requested to 
file a memorandum, not to exceed ten pages, explaining why 
summary disposition should, or should not, be granted by the 
court. 
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be 
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before 
May 20, 1992. 
DAT^-th -,3 0th day of April, 1992. 
Noonan 
Utah Court of Appeals 
EXHIBIT Q 
EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
Attorneys for Appellants 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
F3LED 
3UN 41992 
CL;.'\ - •. 3 Court 
ij; ;.;:; :.._•! Appeals 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ] 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al. 
Defendant/Appellee. 
) CORRECTED MEMORANDUM | IN OPPOSITION TO | SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 920269-CA 
Pursuant to order of the court filed May 1, 1992, appellant 
files this Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Disposition in the 
above matter. 
INTRODUCTION 
This court in its order of May 1, 1992 directed the parties to 
brief the issue of whether summary disposition is appropriate in 
this case. Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allows 
summary disposition where "the grounds for review are so 
insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and 
consideration. . . . " 
The grounds for review in this case are substantial. 
Specifically, the issue in this case is whether due process of law 
requires a court on a Rule 60 motion to vacate an order entered in 
violation of written procedural rules. Moreover, the issues raised 
herein are not the same issues raised in the previous case before 
the court (DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. . 182 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992). (Hereinafter "Fidelity I.") For these 
reasons, this is not a case for summary disposition. 
FACTS 
The trial court in Fidelity I granted summary judgment to 
Fidelity on March 28, 1990. On April 24, 1990 Fidelity hand 
delivered proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment to DeBrys1 counsel (Exhibit A). 
On April 25, 1990 the same findings were mailed to all other 
counsel (Exhibit B). 
On May 2, 1990 the court signed the proposed findings, 
conclusions and judgment (Exhibit C). 
On May 4, 1990 DeBrys1 counsel signed objections to the 
proposed findings under Rule 4-504 and these were filed with the 
court on Monday, May 7, 1990 (Exhibit D). 
Notice of Appeal was filed on May 22, 1990 (Exhibit E). 
On November 16, 1990 Fidelity submitted a proposed order to 
Judge Brian for signing (Exhibit F). 
Judge Brian signed the order on December 11, 1990 (Exhibit G) . 
No new Notice of Appeal was filed following the December 11, 
1990 order which caused this court to dismiss the appeal in 
Fidelity I for lack of jurisdiction (Exhibit H). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS NOT THE SAME AS THE ISSUE 
DECIDED IN DEBRY V. FIDELITY NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. 
In Fidelity I the issue was whether late filed objections to 
the form of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment could be construed to be a Rule 52(b) motion to amend the 
judgment. This court construed the objections as a Rule 52(b) 
motion. In doing so, the appeal was dismissed because a new Notice 
of Appeal had not been filed following entry of the order purpor-
ting to deny DeBrys1 objections to form as a Rule 52(b) motion. 
2 
The issue in this case is different from the issue in Fidelity 
1. The issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion and denied due process of law to DeBrys when it failed 
to vacate or amend its order denying the Rule 52(b) motion upon a 
showing that the entry of the order was obtained in direct 
violation of numerous provisions of the code of administration and 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
For this reason, summary disposition in favor of Fidelity 
would not be warranted in this case. 
POINT II 
FIDELITY OBTAINED THE DECEMBER 11. 1990 
ORDER BY VIOLATING SEVEN SPECIFIC 
WRITTEN PROCEDURAL RULES 
Fidelity's December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit G) was obtained 
following a history of procedural violations as set out below. 
1. Violation of Rule 52 fa) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. provides: 
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when 
the motion is based on more than one ground. 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
Following granting of Fidelity's motion for summary judgment, 
Fidelity submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
support the summary judgment. This was a violation of Rule 52(a) 
because findings and conclusions are not proper or necessary to 
support summary judgment. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Co. v. Atkin. Wright. S Miles. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). This 
uncalled for submission triggered plaintiff to file objections to 
the findings, conclusions and order. 
3 
2. Violations of Rule 4-504(2) Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration and Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 4-504(2) provides: 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and 
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submit-
ted to the court and counsel within five days after 
service. 
Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines the method of 
calculating the time allowed to carry out requirements of the 
Rules. See Exhibit I attached. 
Fidelity violated these rules as follows: The proposed 
findings, conclusions and judgment were delivered to plaintiff 
April 24, 1990 (Exhibit A) . They were mailed to all other counsel 
April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B). Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), using Rule 
6 time computations, the last day for filing objections to the form 
of the judgment was May 7, 1992. Fidelity submitted the order 
early in violation of Rule 4-504(2) and Rule 6. The judge signed 
the order prior to the time allowed for objections. (Exhibit C) 
Plaintiffs' counsel prepared and signed objections to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 4, 1990 and they 
were filed on Monday, May 7, 1990. If Fidelity had not violated 
procedural rules' and submitted the order early, no question would 
have arisen as to whether plaintiffs' objections were a Rule 52(b) 
motion. The confusion was caused by Fidelity's rules violations. 
3. Violation of Rule 4-504(41 Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-504(4) provides: 
(4) Upon entry of judgment notice of such judgment shall 
be served upon the opposing party and proof of such 
service shall be filed with the court. All judgments, 
orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be 
transmitted after signature by the judge, including other 
4 
correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by 
pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows: 
No notice of entry of judgment was sent to anyone by Fidelity. 
When plaintiffs objections under Rule 4-504(2) were filed on May 7, 
1990, counsel was unaware of the May 2, signing of the judgment. 
When it was discovered that the judgment had been filed May 2, 
1990, counsel assumed the Rule 4-504(2) objections were moot1 and 
filed a notice of appeal. 
4. Violation of Rule 4-501 m (b) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides: 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding 
party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten 
days after service of a motion, a memorandum in oppo-
sition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to a motion within ten days after service of 
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided 
in paragraph (1)(d) of this rule. 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
If in fact DeBrys' objections (Exhibit D) were a Rule 52(b) 
motion which was opposed by Fidelity, Rule 4-501(1)(b) requires a 
response in opposition within ten days. Fidelity never responded. 
When Fidelity failed to file a written response, it waived any 
right to submit the motion for decision. Violation of this rule 
denied to plaintiff notice that Fidelity thought a Rule 52(b) 
motion was pending on that Fidelity opposed such a motion. 
5. Violation of Rule 4-501flWdK 
Rule 4-501(1)(d), Code of Judicial Administration provides: 
'A pleading filed out of time has no force or effect. See, 
Rivera v. M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration 
of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either 
party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the 
court for decision. The notification shall be in the 
form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice 
to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain 
a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted 
for decision. 
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows: 
Assuming, arguendo, that a Rule 52(b) motion was pending. If 
Fidelity wanted a ruling, Rule 4-501(1)(d) requires a notice to 
submit for decision. If we assume a violation of Rule 4-501(1)(b) 
did not preclude Fidelity from submitting the motion for decision, 
Fidelity never complied with Rule 4-501(1)(d) which denied notice 
to DeBrys that Fidelity thought a Rule 52(b) motion was pending or 
under consideration for a decision. 
6. Violations of Rule 4-504(1). 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, 
or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file 
with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
Fidelity violated this rule as follows: 
Rule 4-504(1) allows submission of a proposed order only after a 
ruling of the court. Fidelity violated this rule when it submitted 
the December 11, 1990 order for signature. There had been no 
ruling from the court and no request for a ruling. The previous 
rules violations had denied notice to plaintiffs that Fidelity 
thought there was a pending unresolved motion. If plaintiffs had 
been put on such notice, they would have been aware response to a 
Rule 52 (b) motion was underway and a new notice of appeal could 
have been timely filed. 
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7. Additional Violation of Rule 4-504(4). 
In addition to the violation of Rule 4-504(4) set forth in 
paragraph 3 above, Fidelity again violated Rule 4-504(4) as 
follows: 
Having obtained a signature on the December 11, 1990 order in 
violation of procedural rules as set forth above, Fidelity again 
violated rule 4-504(4) by not notifying DeBrys of entry of the 
order. This denied to DeBrys a notice which would have triggered 
the duty to file a new notice of appeal which would have avoided 
dismissal of Fidelity I. 
The numerous flagrant rules violations of Fidelity caused the 
procedural confusion in the case. Being seven nonths into the 
appeal, counsel was not expecting to receive an ex parte order 
which would require a new notice of appeal to be filed. The small 
mistake in plaintiffs office which denied counsel notice of the 
submission of the December 11, 1990 order is inconsequential when 
compared to the numerous and continued violations of rules by 
Fidelity in obtaining entry of the December 11, 1990 order. 
Since DeBrys' counsel was unaware of the entry of the December 
11, 1990 order, no new Notice of Appeal was filed in Case No. 
910329. Failure to file a new Notice of Appeal resulted in 
dismissal of case 910329. See DeBrv v. Fidelity National Title 
Co.. 182 Utah Adv.Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992). 
Immediately upon learning of the December 11, 1990 order, 
plaintiffs filed a Rule 60 motion to amend or vacate uhe order to 
eliminate references to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court denied the motion and this appeal was filed. 
The net result of Fidelity's rules violations has been to 
confer a benefit upon Fidelity when Fidelity I was dismissed 
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because of a procedural technicality. Thus Fidelity has been 
greatly rewarded for violating procedural rules. 
Clearly the lower court abused its discretion when it refused 
to amend or vacate the December 11, 1990 order based upon 
procedural violations by Fidelity at a minimum these issues should 
be briefed prior to this court rendering a. decision. 
POINT III 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS MAY BE 
APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO VACATE OR 
AMEND ITS DECEMBER 11, 1990 ORDER 
Almost seven months after notice of appeal was filed in 
Fidelity I, supra, Fidelity obtained the trial court's signature on 
the December 11, 1990 order. (Exhibit A.) This order was the culm-
ination of numerous specific violations by Fidelity of procedural 
rules. See, Point II, supra. The procedural violations effec-
tively denied the DeBrys due process of law. Had Fidelity followed 
the procedural rules, DeBrys would have had numerous notices and 
opportunities to reply to Fidelity's contention that a Rule 52(b) 
motion was pending. However, Fidelity did not follow the Rules and 
DeBrys were denied notice and an opportunity to respond. 
In Drurv v. Lunceford. 18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), 
the Supreme Court held that procedural rules: 
[A]re to be liberally construed to effectuate justice, 
nevertheless, they were designed to provide a pattern of 
regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts 
could follow and rely upon. 18 Utah 2d at 76. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Llovd v. Third Judicial District Court. 27 Utah 2d 322, 495 
P.2d 12 62 (1972) the Supreme Court defined due process of law as: 
[A] course of legal proceedings according to those rules 
and principles which have been established in our systems 
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of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of 
private rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324. 
The orderly administration of justice (due process) requires 
compliance with procedural rules. Llovd v. Third Judicial District 
Court. supra; Scott v. McNeal. 154 U.S. 34 (1894); Drurv v. 
Lunceford, supra; Mavland v. State. 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977). 
Procedural rules cannot be changed at the whim of the court or a 
party. Mavland v. State, supra. The disregard of procedural rules 
by a trial court cannot be countenanced. Mesa v. Washington State 
Department of Social and Health Services, 683 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 
1982) . Appellate courts routinely reverse trial court rulings 
where procedural rules have been ignored or violated. E.g.. Conner 
v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. 56 N.C. App. 1, 286 S.E.2d 810 (1982) 
review den. 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982); Armstrong v. Lake. 447 N.E.2d 
1153, 1154 (Ind. App. 1983); State v. Turner. 10 Ohio App.3d 328, 
462 N.E.2d 1250 (1983); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain. 442 P.2d 
187 (Colo. 1968); Schleining v. Estate of Morris, 431 P.2d 464 
(Colo. 1967) (en banc); Thomas v. Children's Hospital Ass'n. 535 
P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1975); Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d 1211 (Colo. 
App. 1983). 
A party has a right to rely on application of the Rules as 
written and the court has a duty to enforce the rules as written. 
E.g. . Drurv v. Lunceford. supra; Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain, 
supra; Motz v. Jammaron. supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance 
Co. . supra. Due process of law requires following the regular 
course of proceedings. Simon v. Craft. 182 U.S. 427 (1901). 
In fact, the Colorado Supreme Court sitting en banc stated in 
Schleining v. Estate of Morris, supra: 
The trial court should have adhered to its own published 
rules. The departure here constituted an abuse of its 
discretion. 431 P.2d at 466. 
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Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion when it enters an 
order in violation of procedural rules. I_d; see, Armstrong v. 
Lake, supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. supra; Capitol 
Industrial Bank v. Strain, supra. 
The test for reversal in this case is abuse of discretion. 
Birch v. Birch, supra. If it is an abuse of discretion to enter an 
order in violation of procedural rules, then it follows that it is 
an abuse of discretion to refuse to amend or vacate an order 
entered in violation of procedural rules. Schleinina v. Estate of 
Morris, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the 
December 11, 1990 order due to Fidelity's rules violations. 
The issues raised in this appeal are different apart from the 
issues before the court in DeBry. supra. This ca..s raises serious 
issues relating to the due process rights of the DeBrys to have the 
case proceed in the trial court according to the procedures set out 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
In the event the court does not grant summary disposition to 
appellants, the court should allow full briefing of the 
constitutional and procedural issues raised by this appeal. 
DATED this 7-~ day of June, 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, appellants respectfully petition this Court for 
rehearing. 
III. 
INTRODUCTION 
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the DeBrys 
waived their right to object to procedural irregularities. (See. 
Slip Opinion, Exhibit M at 2.) As a basis for granting summary 
disposition, this Court concluded: 
[A]ppellants' motion to amend the December 11 
order did not mention any of the asserted 
irregularities but merely sought to delete 
references to rule 52(b). We therefore 
conclude that appellants have waived the right 
to assert that Fidelity committed procedural 
violations in obtaining the December 11 order. 
Slip Opinion at 2. 
Rehearing is appropriate in this case because the record 
shows that the alleged procedural irregularities by Fidelity's 
counsel were in fact raised in the trial court as a basis for 
asking the court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the 
December 11, 1990 order. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE PETITION 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court in this case granted 
summary judgment in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Company ("Fidelity") and certified the case for appeal under Rule 
1 
54(b) U.R.C.P. Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity 
hand delivered Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment to the DeBrys' counsel. (See Exhibit A, Appendix.) 
On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to all other counsel in 
the case. (Exhibit B, Appendix.) 
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings 
and judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit C, Appendix.) 
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys' Counsel filed objections to 
the form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. (Exhibit D, Appendix.) 
Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed 
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed 
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit E, Appendix.) For the next seven 
months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot, 
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b) 
motion. 
Approximately seven months later, Fidelity, ex parte. 
obtained the signature of the trial court on an order which pur-
ported to deny a Rule 52 (b) motion to alter or amend the May 2, 
1990 judgment. (Exhibit F, Appendix.) 
Due to a filing error, counsel for the DeBrys was unaware 
the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit F) had been sent to the court. 
See. Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, Appendix, at para. 2. 
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Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990 
order, (Exhibit F) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal. 
Eight months later, when Fidelity filed its brief in the 
Court of Appeals, it then claimed the Court of Appeals had no 
jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys' appeal on its merits because there 
was no notice of appeal filed following entry of the December 11, 
1990 Order. (Exhibit F.) See. Appellee's Brief filed in the Court 
of Appeals at Point I. (Exhibit H.) 
Upon receipt of appellee's brief, counsel for the DeBrys 
first became aware that the December 11,1990 order had been signed 
and entered.1 Counsel then filed a motion with the district court 
asking the trial court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the 
order or to vacate the order. (Exhibit I, Appendix.) 
The memorandum filed with the motion, pursuant to Rule 4-
501 (Exhibit J, Appendix), argued procedural irregularities as a 
basis for the relief sought by the DeBrys. 
The issue of procedural irregularities was again raised 
in the reply memorandum filed in the trial court. (Exhibit K, 
Appendix.) 
At oral argument on the motion, the court was informed 
that a filing error had denied to counsel notice that Fidelity had 
'While it is true a copy of the proposed December 11, 1990 
order was mailed to counsel on November 16, 1990, a filing mistake 
at counsel•s office resulted in counsel not seeing the proposed 
order prior to filing and counsel was never aware the order was 
proposed or signed. (See Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Ex. G.) 
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submitted the December 11 order for signature by the court. See, 
Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, at para. 5(a). 
Counsel argued to the trial court at oral argument that 
had Fidelity followed Rules 4-501 and 4-504 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, at least three separate notices would have 
come to plaintiff and the filing error would not have denied the 
DeBrys the notice necessary to protect their rights to appeal the 
December 11, 1990 order. Id. at para. 5(d). 
Because counsel was unaware the December 11, 1990 order 
was entered, no new notice of appeal was filed. The failure to 
file a new notice resulted in dismissal of the original appeal 
(Case No. 910329-CA) for lack of jurisdiction. (Exhibit L.) 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS BASED UPON THE ERRONEOUS 
ASSUMPTION THAT FIDELITY'S PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS 
WERE WAIVED BY APPELLANT 
This court granted summary disposition based upon an 
erroneous assumption that the DeBrys had waived Fidelity's 
procedural defects by not raising them in the trial court. The 
court stated: 
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated 
seven procedural rules in obtaining the 
December 11, 1990 order. However, on November 
16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel a 
copy of the proposed order denying appellants' 
objections and additions to proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants 
did not object to the proposed order and did 
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not raise any of the alleged procedural 
irregularities. In addition, appellants' 
motion to amend the December 11 order did not 
mention any of the asserted irregularities but 
merely sought to delete references to Rule 
52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants 
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity 
committed procedural violations in obtaining 
the December 11 order. 
Slip Opinion at 2, Exhibit M, Appendix. 
The foundation of this Court's opinion (Exhibit M) 
granting dismissal consists of two assumptions. They are: 
1) The DeBrys had notice of the proposed December 11, 
1990 order and did not object to its entry; and 
2) The procedural irregularities surrounding entry of 
the December 11, 1990 order were not raised by 
counsel in his motion to amend- or vacate the 
December 11, 1990 order and were not brought to the 
attention of the trial court. 
See, Slip Opinion at 2. 
Both of these assumptions are erroneous. Counsel's 
motion to alter or vacate the December 11, 1990 order was supported 
by a memorandum (Exhibit J) which expressly raised the procedural 
irregularities. See, pp. 4-5, Exhibit J. The reply memorandum 
again raised the issue of procedural irregularities. See. Exhibit 
K, pp. 4-5. 
The fact that counsel was unaware of the proposed 
December 11, 1990 order due to a filing error was also raised at 
5 
oral argument on the motions. See. Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, 
Exhibit G at para. 5-7. 
Thus, this court's assumption that counsel for the DeBrys 
knowingly failed to object to the proposed order of December 11 and 
waived Fidelity's procedural errors, has no basis in the record. 
The record shows the opposite to be true. 
Rehearing should be granted because this court's decision 
was based on an erroneous assumption that the DeBrys had waived 
Fidelity's procedural misconduct. 
VI. 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition for 
Rehearing is filed in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
DATED this /-^ day of July, 1992. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants 
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EXHIBIT S 
INTRODUCTION 
The Code of Judicial Administration contains administrative rules and 
rules of professional practice which have been adopted by the Judicial Council 
and the Supreme Court respectively. 
The revision of Article VTII of the Utah Constitution established the Judi-
cial Council as a Constitutional entity and identified the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court as the Presiding Officer of the Council and Chief Administra-
tive Officer of the judiciary. The revision also designated the membership of 
the Council and empowered the Council with the authority to adopt rules for 
the administration of the judiciary. 
Section 4 of Article VIII accomplished important changes in the Supreme 
Court's rulemaking authority as well. Section 4 authorizes the Court to adopt 
rules of procedure and evidence for the courts of the state and to manage, by 
rule, the appellate process, the practice of law and the performance of judicial 
duties by senior judges and justices and judges pro tempore. 
The significance of these changes is that the Judicial Council and the Su-
preme Court now have the tools to manage their own affairs and to enhance 
their status as a co-equal branch of government. Yet, to fully realize these 
goals and to simplify the practice of law, the adoption of uniform rules was 
necessary. Historically, hundreds of administrative rules have been adopted 
by various judicial entities in a myriad of different forms. The Supreme Court 
and legislature have adopted rules of procedure and evidence, the Judicial 
Council has adopted resolutions, the district and circuit courts have adopted 
Rules of Practice and Supplemental Rules of Practice and the local courts 
have adopted administrative orders, general orders and minute entries, all of 
which govern court practice and procedure. 
This proliferation of rules created confusion as to which entity had author-
ity for setting judicial policy and procedure and resulted in contradictory,-
duplicative and inconsistent court practice and procedure. In an effort to elim-
inate this confusion, the Judicial Council approved a plan for the development 
and adoption of the Code of Judicial Administration. The Code consolidates 
into a single publication all of the administrative rules and rules of practice 
which have previously been adopted by the Judicial Council, the Boards of 
Judges and the local courts and the rules of professional practice which have 
been adopted by the Supreme Court. The rules have been reviewed by the 
Supreme Court, the Judicial Council and the Boards of Judges prior to publi-
cation and, where appropriate, modified or repealed to conform with existing 
legislation, Rules of Procedure or preferred practice. Some of the rules con-
tained in the Code are procedural in nature and, although adopted by the 
Council for publication, have been referred to the Supreme Court's Advisory 
Committee for study and adoption as Supreme Court Rules of Procedure. 
Judicial Council Rules. 
The first part of the Code is entitled Rules of Judicial Administration and 
contains the first ten chapters of the Code. Chapters One through Four con-
tain the rules adopted by the Judicial Council and govern the organization 
and procedures of the Council and the administration and operation of the 
courts generally. These rules are initiated and approved by the Judicial Coun-
cil and then each rule is distributed to all persons or agencies affected by the 
rule for a 45-day public comment period. Upon expiration of the comment 
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period, the Council reviews the comments, makes appropriate modifications to 
the rules based upon the comments received and gives final approval to the 
rules. 
Chapters 5 through 9 of the Code contain the rules governing each level of 
court. These rules are initiated and approved by the Boards of Judges and 
subject to ratification by the Judicial Council. Rules of the Boards cannot be 
inconsistent with the rules, standards or goals established by the Council or 
inconsistent with law. Although the Boards are not required to publish their 
rules for a 45-day comment period, the Boards are required to distribute their 
proposed rules to affected agencies and individuals prior to adoption. 
Chapter 10 of the Code contains the rules adopted by the local courts which 
govern local jurisdictions. Local rules are initiated by the presiding judge of a 
multi-judge court or the judge of a single-judge court and are submitted to the 
appropriate Board of Judges for review. The Board reviews the proposed local 
rule for consistency with the Council and Boards' rules, its potential applica-
tion to courts of equal jurisdiction or its potential application to all courts on a 
statewide basis. If the proposed rule is consistent with the rules of the Council 
and the Boards, the Board may approve it as a local rule, adopt it as a Board 
rule or forward it to the Judicial Council for adoption as a Council rule. 
Supreme Court Rules. 
The second part of the Code is entitled Rules of Professional Practice and 
contains the Supreme Court's rules governing the performance of judicial 
duties by senior judges and justices and judges pro tempore, and rules govern-
ing the practice of law. Supreme Court rules are initiated by either the Su-
preme Court itself or the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules 
of Professional Practice. The Committee is responsible for proposing new rules 
or the modification or repeal of existing rules. Once the Committee has formu-
lated a recommendation concerning a specific rule or set of rules, the recom-
mendation is published for a 45-day comment period. At the expiration of the 
comment period, the Committee considers the comments received, modifies its 
recommendation, where appropriate, and forwards the recommendation to the 
Supreme Court for final action. 
The Supreme Court has also established Advisory Committees in the areas 
of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Appellate Procedure, Juvenile Proce-
dure and Evidence. Like the Committee on the Rules of Professional Practice, 
these Committees are responsible for studying existing rules and proposals for 
new rules and making recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning the 
adoption, modification or repeal of a rule or proposal. The rules of procedure 
and evidence are contained in the Court Rules volume of the Utah Code. 
Appendices. 
The final part of the Code of Judicial Administration is the set of Appendi-
ces, which contains the Manual of Procedures for Judicial Nominating Com-
missions, the Rules of Procedure for the Ethics Advisory Committee, Uniform 
Fee, Fine and Bail Schedules, Sentence and Release Guidelines, Criteria for 
Certification of Court Transcribers, and Records Retention Policy for state 
courts. 
Rulemaking Schedule. 
The Council meets annually in April and May to review proposals for the 
adoption, modification or repeal of Council and Board rules and to ratify local 
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supplemental rules. Interested individuals may file a written request for the 
adoption, modification or repeal of a Council or Board rule with the Judicial 
Council, c/o General Counsel, Administrative Office of the Courts, 230 South 
500 East, Suite #300, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Supreme Court's Advisory Committees meet annually in September to 
formulate their agenda for the upcoming year. Petitions for the adoption, 
repeal or amendment of a rule of procedure, evidence or professional practice 
may be filed with the appropriate Advisory Committee, c/o General Counsel, 
Administrative Office of the Courts, at the above address, by September 1 of 
each year. 
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